Labor Queues, Discrimination, and Affirmative Action by Bisping, Timothy Otto
LABOR QUEUES, DISCRIMINATION, AND 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
By 
TIMOTHY OTTO BISPING 
Bachelor of Business Administration 
The Wichita State University 
Wichita, Kansas 
1991 
Master of Arts 
The Wichita State University 
Wichita, Kansas 
1993 
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate College of the 
Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for 
the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
December, 1997 
LABOR QUEUES, DISCRIMINATION, AND 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Dissertation Approved: 
ii 
ACKNOWLEDMENTS 
I would like to express my thanks to everyone who has helped me throughout the 
process of completing this research as well as completing my degree. I wish to thank my 
dissertation committee for contributing to this research and all of the faculty and staff of 
the Department of Economics who have supported me throughout my education. I would 
especially like to express my gratitude to Dr. Jim Fain for his unending patience and 
support during this research and all aspects of my graduate education. 
In addition to everyone who has helped me with my graduate work, I would like to 
thank all of my family and friends who have supported me throughout my entire 
education. I would like to especially thank my wife, Jeanie, whose support, patience, and 
encouragement have made all of this possible. 
Its been a long haul Jeanie, but we made it! 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter 
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... I 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................... 4 
A. Legislation ................................................................ 4 
B. Unemployment Differentials by Race and Gender ................... 6 
i. Empirical Evidence on the Determinants of 
Unemployment Differentials .................................. 6 
ii. Labor Queues ........................................... , . . . . . . 11 
C. Effects of Civil Rights Legislation .................................... 13 
D. Summary ................................................................ 20 
III. HYPOTIIESIS .............................................................................. 22 
A. Origins of the Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
B. The Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
IV. METHODOLOGY .......................................................................... 27 
A. Econometric Analysis .................................................. 27 
B. Analysis of Duration and Incidence ................................. 29 
V. DATA ..................................................................................... 33 
VI. ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
A. Vector Autoregression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
1. Stat1onanty ......... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
11. Lag Lengths . .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . . . .. . . . . . . .. .. .. .. . . .. . .. 3 5 
111. Verification of the Sample Split .. .... . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. 36 
1v. The Model ........ ... .. . ... .. . ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 37 
v. Impulse Response Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
VI. VAR Results .................................................. 44 
I. cumulative impulse response functions prior to 
affirmative action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
2. cumulative impulse response functions after 
affirmative action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
iv 
3. conclusions of VAR analysis ..................... 60 
C. Analysis of Unemployment Duration and Incidence ............ 60 
i. Technique for Estimating Unemployment Duration .... 61 
ii. Duration Estimates . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
iii. Interpretation of Duration Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 
iv. Techniques for Estimating Unemployment Incidence .. 71 
v. Incidence Results ............................................ 72 
v1. Summary and Conclusions of Duration and Incidence 
Analysis ...................................................... 75 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS ........................................................... 77 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................. 80 
APPENDIXES ..................................................................................... 83 
APPENDIX A- -VAR Parameter Estimates ................................................. 83 
APPENDIX B- -Cumulative Impulse Response Functions, 1959-1967 .................. 96 
APPENDIX C- -Cumulative Impulse Response Functions, 1968-1980 .................. 98 
APPENDIX D- -Estimated Unemployment Duration with Various Values of g(x) ... 100 
APPENDIX E- -Human Subjects Approval.. ............................................... 101 
V 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 
1. Continuation Rates for Selected groups ..................................................... 67 
2. Estimated Unemployment Duration (weeks). ........................................... .-.... 68 
3. Incidence Rates for Selected Groups(%) ................................................... 73 
4. Duration and Incidence Summary, 1968-198 ............................................... 76 
5. VAR Parameter Estimates ..................................................................... 83 
6. Cumulative 36 Month Impulse Response Functions, 1959-1967 .......................... 95 
7. Cumulative 36 Month Impulse Response Functions, 1968-1980 ......................... 97 
8. Estimated Unemployment Duration with Various Values of g(x) ......................... 99 
vi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 
1. Unemployment Share/Share of Labor Force.......................................... 2 
2. Shock in White Male Unemployment Rate, 1959-1967 .............................. 46 
3. Shock in White Female Unemployment Rate, 1959-1967 ......................... .47 
4. Shock in Nonwhite Male Unemployment Rate, 1959-1967 ........................ .49 
5. Shock in Nonwhite Female Unemployment Rate, 1959-1967 ...................... 51 
6. Shock in White Male Unemployment Rate, 1968-1980 ............................. 53 
7. Shock in White Female Unemployment Rate, 1968-1980 ............................ 55 
8. Shock in Nonwhite Male Unemployment Rate, 1968-1980 ......................... 57 
9. Shock in Nonwhite Female Unemployment Rate, 1968-1980 ...................... 59 
10. Estimated Unemployment Duration, 1968-1980 ..................................... 69 
11. Selected Incidence Rates, 1968-1980 .................................................. 7 4 
vii 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The relative status of women and racial minorities in the labor force has been 
undergoing significant change for decades. The most notable of these changes in recent 
history originated as early as the late 1950s and early 1960s. Throughout this time period 
the status of these groups underwent changes not only relative to white males, but also 
relative to one another. One such change in the relative status of women and racial 
minorities is demonstrated through relative unemployment rates. 
As is illustrated in Figure 1, the unemployment burden of white females relative to 
nonwhite males and nonwhite females has varied over time. Prior to the late 1960s, the 
status of nonwhite individuals ( especially nonwhite males) relative to white females was 
improving significantly. However, beginning in the late 1960s this trend began to reverse. 
This is especially interesting given the fact that while the status of white women relative to 
racial minorities improved in terms of unemployment during this period, women were 
entering the labor force in unprecedented numbers. The question of what caused this shift 
in the unemployment burden in the late 1960s has yet to be thoroughly addressed and will 
be examined in the following chapters. 
During this time of change in the relative unemployment burdens of these groups, 
beginning in the mid 1960s and continuing primarily into the early 1970s, civil rights 
legislation was passed aimed at ending labor force discrimination and promoting labor 
force advances by women and racial minorities. Although numerous explanations of this 
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trend reversal are possible, the concurrent nature of the shift in the unemployment burden 
and the introduction of civil rights legislation raises the question of whether the civil rights 
legislation of the 1960s had some perverse effect in terms of the status of racial minorities 
relative to white women. The current knowledge of the forces driving labor force changes 
and the impact of civil rights legislation is simply not sufficient to answer these questions. 
The current state of the literature is such that it is difficult to discern whether a 
relationship between civil rights legislation and relative unemployment burdens exists. 
While opinions on the merit of racial and gender equality in the United States have been 
r.onverging in recent decades, serious conflict arises when the issue of correcting existing 
inequalities is addressed. For the question at hand, it is essential to note that significant 
disagreement exists regarding whether or not past legislation has been successful in 
lowering the level of inequality in the workplace. While the passing of civil rights 
legislation in the 1960s and early 1970s was a major attempt by the United States 
government to end inequality in the labor force, a general consensus regarding the 
effectiveness of these programs has yet to be reached in the literature. Several previous 
studies have examined this issue focusing on the absolute gains of minorities and women 
as well as gains made relative to white males (Burstein 1979, Leonard 1984, Smith and 
Welch 1984, Heckman and Wolpin 1976, Goldstein and Smith 1976). Nevertheless most 
have failed to examine possible changes in the position of certain minority groups relative 
to one another. In addition, past research fails to examine the effects of such legislation 
on unemployment rates and therefore overlooks a possibly unexpected result of civil rights 
legislation, that being the advance of white females at the expense of racial minority 
populations. Furthermore, many of these studies have employed less than optimal 
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methods of analysis. Correcting these inadequacies by thoroughly examining changes in 
relative employment status is the focus of this research. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following review of the literature will focus on those studies which are most 
closely related to the topic of this study. Therefore it will focus on those studies which aid 
in understanding the cause·ofthe change in relative unemployment burdens experienced in 
the post 1968 period and the possible role played by civil rights legislation in that change. 
Past research has failed to examine this issue specifically. Those studies which are most 
closely related to this research topic typically take one of two forms. The first of these 
simply examine the determinants of unemployment rate differentials (usually the 
differential between white men and women/racial minorities), but typically fail to consider 
the possible impact of civil rights legislation on this differential. The second type examine 
the impact of civil rights legislation on earnings and employment shares ( among other 
things) of women and racial minorities but fail to consider its possible impact on the 
overall status of women and racial minorities in the labor market as a whole, or its impact 
on the status of women and racial minorities relative to one another. Despite the fact that 
previous work has not· addressed several relevant issues, a basic understanding of past 
findings is essential to the current work at hand. The following literature review will 
examine the major studies in the areas mentioned above and will provide background 
information on civil rights legislation and the trends in the labor force status of women and 
racial minorities. 
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A. Legislation 
The first major legislative step designed to deter discrimination in the United States 
occurred with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits discrimination 
in all aspects of employment by race and sex. Title VII of that act established the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) which provides a means through which 
adherence to the elements of Title VII can be effectively monitored. In 1965, by executive 
Order No. 11246, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) was established 
which was designed to enforce the provisions within that order. Executive Order No. 
11246 prohibits discrimination by race among government contractors and applies to all 
firms who contract with the federal government in an amount of $50,000 or more, and 
employ at least 50 workers. In 1966 the EEOC began requiring all firms in the private 
sector with at least 100 employees, and all contractors with the federal government who 
have contracts of at least $50,000 or have at least 50 employees (expanded to 15 
employees in 1972), to report detailed employment numbers by race and gender. In 1967, 
Order No. 11246 was amended by Order No. 11375 to include the prohibition of 
discrimination by gender. Enforcement of these orders was taken to an unprecedented 
level in 1968 when the OFCC began requiring federal coritractors to develop and present 
an affirmative action plan designed to take direct steps in correcting past inequities in 
labor market practices. Order No. 4 from the Secretary of Labor in 1970 and its revision 
in 1971 brought additional focus to the definition of affirmative action. The revision to 
Order No. 4 in 1971 added emphasis on sex discrimination and led to the implementation 
of specific affirmative action guidelines by 1972. Also in 1972, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act was passed which amended the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in a way 
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which strengthened the EEOC in a number of ways and aided in correcting for past 
deficiencies in enforcement powers (Smith 1984). 
B. Unemployment Differentials by Race and Gender 
Several studies have examined unemployment rate differentials by race and gender, 
the causes of these differentials, and how they have changed over time. While methods 
are diverse and the manner in which discrimination is measured varies widely across 
studies, a brief examination of these works can add valuable insight. 
i. Empirical Evidence on the Determinants of Unemployment Differentials 
Richard B. Freeman examined the relative status of black Americans is his paper 
entitled "Changes in the Labor Market for Black Americans, 1948-1972". Although this 
paper has a much broader scope than just employment effects, it does include several 
interesting notes on employment. First of all, Freeman notes that although significant 
advances occurred for black Americans over the time period observed, gains in terms of 
the unemployment rate were disappointing. In fact he notes that the unemployment rate 
for blacks was roughly twice that of whites for most of the time period in question (similar 
results are found with respect to white women (Ehrenberg 1980)). According to 
Freeman, the black/white unemployment rate ratio for men appears to have peaked in 
1962 and then began a downward trend. On the other hand, the same ratio for women 
appears to have risen in the earlyJ950's (as was the case for men) fallen in the late 1950's 
and leveled off in the 1960s. Another fact noted by Freeman is the greater sensitivity of 
black employment to short term changes in GNP relative to white employment. This is 
found to be the case for white women as well (Ehrenberg 1980). Black women were 
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found to experience a more rapid labor market advance than black men throughout the 
period, although black women started the period in a relatively worse position. The. 
relative labor force participation rates for both black men and women were falling over the 
period. The labor force participation rate of black women is shown to rise during a 
recession which is opposite of the behavior of white women. 
Freeman further examines the labor market throughout this period by examining 
possible changes in the demand and supply for minority workers. He notes that the 
demand for black workers may have changed considerably due to the decreases in the 
demand for discrimination (possibly due to civil rights legislation), changes in attitudes 
toward discrimination, and the expansion of relatively nondiscriminatory sectors of the 
economy. Supply side shifts such as an increase in the level of schooling achieved by 
blacks and a shift of black workers to occupations with better employment opportunities 
are also pointed out by the author. Upon analyzing demand and supply shifts separately, 
Freeman concludes tentatively that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had a positive effect on 
the relative position of blacks in the labor market in terms of earnings and occupational 
position. It is necessary to note, however, that the issue of the relative status between 
minorities and women in terms of unemployment is not examined. 
Upon reviewing the literature it is apparent that many factors influence differences 
in unemployment rates. A reasonably typical study on this matter which uses 1990 census 
data was presented by Leslie Stratton in her 1993 article titled ''Racial Differences in 
Men's Unemployment". According to Stratton, her results are consistent with previous 
work in finding that only 20-40% of men's racial unemployment differential can be 
explained by ''variables other than race". However, demographic factors such as 
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education, age, and marital status are significant determinants. These results suggest that 
in 1990, race still played an important role in determining unemployment rate differentials. 
Other authors have noted that blacks may experience higher unemployment rates due to a 
higher level of job turnover. (Barrett and Morgenstern 1974) 
An article by Lora Holcombe (1988) examines the black/white unemployment rate 
differential over the period of 1950-1980, with a focus on the determinants of this 
differential and how they have changed over time. Holcombe uses microcensus data from 
the years 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980. From this data, she attempts to analyze the 
probability of unemployment by demographic group through the use of a Blinder 
decomposition. The primary focus of this paper is the finding that in 1950 blacks were 
less likely to be unemployed, both males and females, than were whites. On the other 
hand, in 1960, 1970 and 1980 whites were less likely to be unemployed than blacks. In 
her analysis, Holcombe controls for age, education,. classification of worker (private 
employment, government employment, self employed etc.) and other demographic 
characteristics and finds that most characteristics, including education, contribute 
significantly to changing the probability of unemployment. 
The Blinder decomposition applied by Holcombe offers two possible "effects" 
accounting for the difference in unemployment probabilities. The first of these is the 
"endowment effect" which represents differences in mean demographic characteristics 
between groups. The second contributing factor is the "residual effect" which is 
attributable to differing labor force relationships. The decomposition reveals that the 
endowment effect is almost entirely responsible for blacks having a lower unemployment 
probability than whites in 1950. In other words, blacks were less likely to be unemployed 
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than whites in 1950 because of differing demographic characteristics. By 1980 most of 
the unemployment rate differential was due to the residual effect (represented by.differing 
coefficients) which implies that blacks had relatively worse labor force ties, suggesting the 
existence of discrimination. 
Holcombe offers two possible explanation for the change in the unemployment 
probabilities of blacks and whites. She .attributes one possible explanation to the work of 
Murray (1984) who focuses on the civil rights legislation of the 1960s and its possible 
effect on disincentives to minorities in terms of .acquiring the skills .necessary for 
employment. A second possible explanation is the effect of labor market desegregation 
that has occurred. since 1950. For example, as labor markets became less segregated, it is 
possible that blacks who previously worked for black employers ( along with other black 
individuals) may have found themselves competing against whites for jobs provided by 
white employers. Thus in a way desegregation may have opened a door to discrimination. 
Measuring asymmetry in the labor force can also be accomplished through the use 
of wage differentials and occupational segregation. For the purpose of this study, the 
effect of these measures of inequality on unemployment rate differentials is the relevant 
issue. Previous work has suggested that occupational segregation may account for as 
much as half of the unemployment rate differential, but the effect of wage inequality on 
these differentials is less clear (Flanagan, 1978). According to Flanagan, traditional 
demand side theories of discrimination have suggested that as wage differentials narrow 
unemployment differentials should increase. Flanagan shows however, that wage 
differential may have important supply side effects as well in terms of labor market 
turnover. In fact, he argues that higher wage differentials increase the black quit rate and 
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raise the probability that blacks who quit will become unemployed. He also finds some 
evidence that younger black workers are assigned relatively less stable jobs. From his 
statistical analysis he concludes that narrowing wage differentials should narrow 
unemployment differentials for experienced workers (.similar results are implied in terms of 
the duration of unemployment differentials by Nord and Ting, 1994). Flanagan's results 
are less conclusive concerning the impact on labor force entrants. This research, at the 
very least, makes it apparent that wage differentials are an important factor in determining 
racial unemployment differentials. 
Gender unemployment differentials have received considerable attention in the 
literature as wcll. The majority of the literature in this area reaches similar conclusions 
and can therefore be summarized in a reasonably concise manner. 
In the 1974 article titled "The Female-Male Differential in Unemployment Rates" 
Beth Niemi ( 197 4) hypothesizes that the unemployment rate differential is most likely to 
be attributable to any of three causes. These possible causes are: 1) relatively more 
frequent movement of women into and out of the labor force 2) women receiving 
relatively les~ specific training and 3) the occupational and geographical immobility of 
women. The author finds that during the period under study each of the hypothesized 
causes was significant, but that the primary cause·ofthe female-male unemployment rate 
differential was the extensive movement of women into and out of the labor force. 
Other studies on the female-male unemployment rate differential dissect the 
unemployment rate into the duration of unemployment spells and the frequency of 
unemployment spells. These studies typically find that the primary cause of this 
differential is that women experience a higher level of job turnover relative to men. 
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Indeed, research in _this .area _typically .finds .that women experience shorter duration of 
unemployment than do their male counterparts (Sandell (1980), Bowers and Harkess 
(1979), Marston, (1976)). In addition to finding that women experience more frequent 
and shorter spells of unemployment, Stephen Marston demonstrates that the primary 
driving force behind the cyclical nature of the female unemployment rate is failure to 
achieve successful labor force entry. 
An interesting approach to studying the female-male unemployment rate was 
undertaken by Janet Johnson in her 1983 article entitled "Sex Differentials in 
Unemployment Rates: A Case for No Concern". The author finds that the gender 
unemployment differential is pr-ocylical which she argues provides evidence against 
discrimination being the driving force behind the unemployment rate differential. In 
addition, the author concludes that if women and men had the same characteristics during 
the time period under consideration, women would be less likely to be unemployed than 
their male cohorts. 
ii. Labor Queues 
A common phenomenon noted in the literature that is related to the existence of 
unemployment rate differentials, and therefore to this topic of this research, is the 
existence oflabor queues. The literature notes that unemployed individuals essentially 
have to ''wait in line" for jobs. Given this fact, one possible explanation for the observed 
unemployment rate differentials is that for whatever reason, there may be an ordering in 
the queue regarding who firms prefer to hire first (Reskin 1990). Although labor queues 
can be used to explain many labor market phenomena they can be especially useful in 
explaining differences in unemployment rates (Thurow 1975). Ifit is true that the 
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preferences of firms ar.e related to race and gender, much of the unemployment differential 
could be explained. Essentially if firms discriminate in hiring from pools of unemployed 
people by hiring· from those groups that they prefer the most first, then those groups 
furthest down the labor queue will have to wait the longest for jobs. This relationship 
between labor queues and discrimination in hiring. formalizes the relationship between 
unemployment rate differentials and discrimination and is essential in understanding . 
unemployment rate differentials. 
An insightful attempt to explain differences in unemployment rates among 
demographic groups that focuses on labor queues and is related to the hypothesis of this 
paper was presented by Shulman (1986). Shulman has two basic points that are relevant 
to this topic. First of all he argues that gains in human-capital made by disadvantaged 
groups may not be helpful during times of high unemployment if discrimination exists. 
During times of high unemployment, the cost of discriminations falls as high numbers of 
qualified white individuals are available for work. In essence, as nonwhite individuals 
attempt to work up the labor queue they are .continually bumped back during bad 
economic times as qualified white individuals enter unemployment. Secondly, according 
to Shulman, in-recent years-discrimination has simply shifted more towards discrimination 
in employment from wage discrimination. In fact, according to Shulman, it is possible that 
firms simply decided to obey the wage discrimination portion of Title VII and to "shirk" 
on the employment side. Thus in the presence oflabor queues generated by 
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discrimination, Federal legislation that works to help eliminate wage differentials would 
just worsen employment discrimination as the cost of hiring minority groups increases1. 
The research discussed above has examined the trends in labor force status as well 
as determinants ofunemploymentrate differentials, however past re.sear.ch has failed in 
two key areas. First, past research has failed to examine the possible effects of civil rights 
legislation. Secondly, it fails.to examine po.ssible changes which may have occurred -
during the period under question regarding the status of women and racial minorities 
relative to one-another. Therefore, -in the search for literature which takes these factors 
into consideration, the next section will focus on studies which have actually examined the 
effects of civil rights legislation. 
C. Effects of Civil Rights Legislation 
The most abundant literature dealing with the effects civil right legislation does not 
deal with unemployment .differentials per .se, rather such studies tend to focus on changes 
in employment shares and employment growth. Often such studies restrict themselves to 
examining changes in the employment status.of women and/or racial minorities relative to 
white men. Alternatively, some authors examine the difference between the increases of 
employment shares ofwomen and racial minorities in firms "covered" by the EEOC as 
opposed to "non-covered" firms. The following section will present the results of the 
major studies in this area and provide a general picture .of the status of research on the 
topic. 
1 Note that this is similar to Becker discrimination where employers will only hire certain groups at a 
discounted wage. If a discriminating employer cannot hire those groups at that discounted wage, it may 
not hire them at all. 
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A thorough examination of the trends in the relative status of minorities and 
women in the labor force is presented by James P. Smith and Finis Welch (1984). In their 
article entitled "Affirmative Action and Labor Markets", Smith and Welch examine the 
status of women and racial minorities in the years 1966, 1970, 1974, 1978, and 1980. The 
authors utilize data from the EEOC (EEO-I data) reported by firms in the above 
mentioned years and data from the Current Population Survey. The primary hypothesis of 
this paper is that through the relevant years minority representation should experience 
more growth iµ. firms that are required to report to the EEOC as opposed to firms that are 
not required to report to the EEOC. In addition, it is hypothesized that the gains will be 
the largest among reporting firms that are federal contractors. 
An interesting note made by Smith and Welch is that the percent of black workers, 
both male and female, who were employed in .covered firms r-ose dramatically during the 
time period, especially in the period from 1966 to 1974. The percent of white women 
working in covered firms, on the other hand, changed little during the time period 
mentioned above. The authors also examine the occupational and wage differences by 
race and gender through the period, however, these results are less relevant to the purpose 
of this research and will not be discussed in this section. The primary method used by the 
authors in testing their hypotheses is a simple comparison of the growth rates and/or 
shares of employment of each demographic group in EEO-I reporting and non EEO-I 
reporting fifII1$. The .authors. conclude that .substantial gains were made by women and 
especially minorities in the period examined, although they question the validity of the 
EEO-I data. Specifically they find that women and racial minorities experienced the 
greatest advances in covered firms, especially in those which were government 
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contractors. However, to the surprise of the authors most of the gains were made in the 
pre-1974 period, a period in which the authors suggest that the enforcement powers of the 
EEOC and the OFCC were weak if not insufficient. 
In determining the impact of civil rights legislation, several authors· have turned 
their attention toward Affirmative Action. Such studies therefore focus on the efforts of 
the OFCC and its relative impact on government contracting and non-contracting firms. 
Goldstein and Smith (1976) specifically examine the "impact of the 
antidiscrimination program aimed at federal contractors." They employ a simple firm level 
cross-sectional examination of the change in the relative status of women and racial 
minorities in contractor versus non-contractor firms in the time period from 1970-1972. It 
is appropriate to note that the authors acknowledge the limitations of this technique with 
regard to the absence of data back to the start of the program (prior to 1970), and the 
exclusion of possible effects of anti-discriminatory policies on non-contractor firms. 
The authors explore possible changes in wages as well as changes in employment 
shares. For the purpose of this research, the interest lies in the results on changes in 
employment shares. The authors regress variables such as total employment at a plant, the 
change in employment at a given plant, the employment share of other race-sex groups in 
1970, and dummy variables for presence of government contract and the occurrence of a 
compliance review, on the employment share of a given race-sex group. 
The results of the Goldstein and Smith paper are as follows. First, the authors find 
that the relative change in black employment share was greater ( and positive) in contractor 
firms as opposed to non-contractor and even more so in firms subjected to a compliance 
review. The results for black females, however, show no statistically significant difference 
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in contractor firms as opposed to non-contractor firms. The story for the impact of 
antidiscrimination policy on whites is quite different. Goldstein and Smith find that white 
males gained from such policies, a fact that the authors have difficulty in explaining. Also, 
they find that white females were actually hurt by such policies in that their employment 
shares actually grew by less in contractor firms relative to non-contractor firms. The 
authors suggest that the overall impact of Affirmative Action on women in general is· not 
surprising given the fact that the focus of Affirmative Action was on racial minorities 
rather than women prior to 1972. 
A similar analysis was undertaken by James Heckman and Kenneth Wolpin (1976). 
Their analysis was centered around firm level data in the Chicago area. The method used 
by Heckman and Wolpin is similar to that used by Goldstein and Smith. However, the 
authors point out that previous work may be flawed ( also noting the caveats presented by 
Goldstein and Smith) primarily in terms of the treatment of the contract award process. 
The authors point out that government agencies may indeed often award contract to firms 
who had a high relative minority-women employment ratio regardless of contract status. 
Therefore, any differential between contractor versus non-contractor may be due simply to 
a "successful selection process" and not to a change in the employment practices of firms. 
In turn, the authors attempt to control for this in their study. 
The results of this research can be summarized as follows. First of all, firms with 
government contracts are likely to employ more blacks males than identical no-contractor 
firms. On the other hand, the authors find that contractor firms hire somewhat fewer 
black females and fewer white females as well. Contractor firms are also more likely to 
hire individuals in the "other" racial category. 
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Thus it appears as though there is a general consensus regarding the effects of 
Affirmative Action during the during the first few yeai;s of the 1970's in terms of 
employment shares. Specifically, it appears as though in terms of employment black males 
were helped by such policies, whereas black females may have been hurt. White males 
may have benefited and white females probably suffered adverse consequences associated 
with affirmative action in terms of employment shares. However, the early 1970's is not 
the only relevant time period; several other studies have focused on other time periods 
since the passing of the civil rights legislation of the 1960' s. 
Jonathan Leonard (1984) has examined the effects of Affirmative Action 
extensively. Unlike previous authors, Leonard examines the effects of Affirmative Action 
during the 1974-1980 period. However, his primary measure of the effectiveness of 
Affirmative Action is once again simply a comparison of contractor and non-contractor 
firms. He hypothesizes that if Affirmative Action was effective through the 1974-1980 
period, the "rate of change of protected groups' employment share will be higher in 
contractor establishments than in non-contractor establishments, ceteris paribus." He notes 
that 1974 was an important year in terms Affirmative Action's focus on women and its 
enforcement power. 
Leonard observes that during the time period in question black and female 
employment did indeed grow faster in contractor firms than it did in non-contractor firms. 
To confirm this observation the author employs the use of a regression in order to 
determine the effect of contractor status and compliance review on the employment share 
of a given demographic group. He controls for establishment size, industry, region, and 
occupational and corporate structure. The results of this regression show that during the 
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time period in question the employment share grew 3.8% faster in contractor 
establishments than in non-contractor establishments for black males, 7. 9% faster for other 
minority males, 2.8% faster for white females, and 12.3% faster for black females. White 
male employment share grew 1.2% slower in contractor firms. Compliance reviews are 
found to increase the employment share of black males by an additional 7.9%, other 
minority males by 15.2%, and black females by 6.1%. Compliance reviews caused white 
female share to grow more slowly among contracting firms, but had no significant impact 
on white male employment shares. Leonard also attempts to present his results in terms of 
demand shifts. He assumes that Affirmative Action has not altered labor demand among 
non-contractors, that demand elasticities are equal among contractors and non-
contractors, and that all firms face the same supply curve. Leonard concludes that 
Affirmative Action has increased the demand for women and racial minorities relative to 
white males. The effects are largest for non-black minority males and black females. The 
effects are somewhat smaller for black males and white females. 
A more unique approach to examining the effects of antidiscrimination legislation 
is presented by James Heckman and Brook Payner (1979) in the article entitled 
''Determining the Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of 
Blacks: A Study of South Carolina." This article differs from past research in that it 
attempts to explain a observed time-series phenomenon. Specifically, it examines the 
changes that occurred in the relative status of blacks in manufacturing, primarily during 
the 1960's. The authors point out that almost precisely at the year 1965, the economic 
status of blacks began to improve significantly both in terms of employment and wages. 
The question raised by the authors is whether or not this improvement can be attributed 
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directly to federal antidisrimination legislation, or if there were other forces at work 
bringing about this change. 
The authors explore several competing explanations for the sudden and rapid 
improvement in black economic status that began circa 1965,.aside from the contribution 
of antidiscrimination policy. These explanations are summarized by the authors as "human 
capital stories, supply shift stories, and tight labor market stories." (Heckman and Payner 
1979, 138) Upon considering the impact of several items unique to the South Carolina 
labor market at the time, the .authors set out .to test each one of these explanations 
separately. The authors conclude that changes in educational attainment and changes in 
industrial structure could not entirely explain ihe improvements in the labor force status of 
blacks. The authors also conclude that tight labor markets alone are not likely to be the 
sole determinant of this change of black status, although this hypothesis could not be 
directly tested. The authors also recognize the fact.that the tight labor market hypothesis 
cannot be rejected with certainty. Indeed the authors acknowledge the fact that the labor 
market in South Carolina in the 1960s was unusually tight and that employers may simply 
have used federal antidiscrimination policy as an "excuse to do what they wanted to do 
anyway'' (Heckman and Payner 1979, 17 4 ), that is, tap a plentiful reserve of low wage 
labor. They attempt to explain the change in black economic status through the use of 
econometric techniques and attribute any ''unexplained" (the residual) change in status to 
government policy and find that the "residual" ( and therefore government activity) plays a 
significant role. 
It is apparent that Heckman and Payner's results are not entirely conclusive, nor 
are they likely to be generalizable, however, they do suggest-that federal anti-
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discrimination legislation ..did indeed have an impact on the economic status of blacks in 
South Carolina. 
D. Summary 
The most salient points of literature review presented in the previous sections can 
j 
be summarizep as follows: 1) unemployment .differ-entials -experienced by minorities have 
persisted for many years, 2) unemployment differentials are probably caused by 
demographic characteristics-as well.as_discrimination (possibly in the form-0flabor 
queues), 3) during the 1960-1980 period, blacks experienced large unemployment 
differentials due primarily to .differing labor force ties , -4) civil rights legislation probably 
helped black males in terms of employment shares, 5) civil rights legislation probably 
improved the ,status of whit-e women as w-ell as black. women in terms of employment 
shares, although the evidence is mixed, 6) the effects of such legislation on the 
employment share of whit-e males is uncertain. 
There indeed is no shortage of research involving unemployment rate differentials 
by race and gender, nor is there a shortage r-egarding the impact of .civil rights legislation 
on employment. However, the literature is lacking in several ways. Research has not been 
undertaken to,.specifically examine the change in the relative burden.of unemployment 
between females and racial minorities which began in the late 1960s. In addition, civil 
rights legislation has rarely been mentioned as a .cause of changes in unemployment 
differentials, and seldom, if ever, been used as an explanation for the changes in the 
unemployment rate burden -mentioned above. 
Studies which have previously examined determinants of unemployment rate 
differentials have focused primarily on demographic differences between race-gender 
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groups. Others have focused on differences in labor force attachment. However, even the 
most thorough of studies tend to overlook changes in the differential between females 
( especially wlµte females) .aruLraciaLminority groups -and the determinants of sueh 
changes. 
Research that has focused on the effects of civil rights legislation ( especially 
affirmative action) has been.limited in_scope as well. First of all, research in this area does 
not address the possibility of gains made by white females at the expense of minority 
groups. Seco,ndly, such_stwlies often focus _simply .on ~oyment _shares of r.ace-.gender 
groups in contractor versus non-contractor firms, while overlooking the effects of civil 
rights legislation on the status of race-gender ..group in the economy as a whole. It is quite 
possible, for instance, that if nonwhite employment grows faster in firms who contract 
with the government, .the unemployment ..rate for that ..group .may .still wor.sen, ..or at the 
very least may be worse than it would have been in the absence of such legislation. 
Indeed, such~ measure of the impact oflegislation does not consider changes.in the labor 
force growth of various demographic groups, changes in hiring and firing practices of 
firms, the effe_pts that such legislation.may Jiave .on the non-..contracting .or non-reporting 
sectors of the economy, or any other factor related to unemployment. For example, is it 
accurate to no,te that .civil rights legislation actually hurt white females given the fact that 
their labor force participation grew dramatically during the time period while their relative 
unemploymen,t position improved? Might it be po.s.sible that .the employment growth rate 
for white females, for example, was lower in contracting firms than it was in non-
contacting firms be.cause they .simply experienced tremendous .growth in employment with 
non-contracting firms who wanted to appear to be non-discriminating? Therefore, the 
21 
examination of mere employment growth and employment shares in particular firms or 
industries does not provide sufficient information to measure the overall impact of any 
piece of legislation. 
These mentioned shortcomings in the current state of the literature lead to the 
purpose of this current work. It is apparent that research is necessary that considers two 
things beyond what is currently provided in the current literature. First, a thorough 
analysis of changes in unemployment burdens must be developed. Secondly, this analysis 
must consider the possible role of civil rights legislation in shifting the unemployment 
burden. 
ID. HYPOTHESIS 
A. Origins of the Hypothesis 
While several authors have examined differences in employment by race and 
gender, few have offered explanations that are capable of explaining the aforementioned 
trend reversal in unemployment burdens. For instance, human capital arguments are often 
used to explain unemployment gaps. In order to explain this trend reversal using a human 
capital explanation one of two things would have to be true. First, either large changes in 
relative human capital would have had to occur, or secondly, it would behave to be true 
that in order to meet affirmative action requirements firms simply hired individuals with 
the most human capital and those individuals just happened to be white females. 
However, neither of these appear to be likely candidates for explaining this trend reversal 
because during this time the human capital gap between minorities and white males was 
narrowing for nonwhite individuals, and nearly constant for white females (Burstein, 
1979). These trends in the human capital gap are not consistent with a widening 
22 
unemployment gap. Other authors have focused on changes in the wage gap as a factor in 
determining the employment gap. Although the effects of the wage gap may not be 
thoroughly understood, one would suspect that, in the absence of employment 
discrimination, changes in the wage gap would have similar effects on employment for all 
groups relative to white males. However, this is not the observed phenomenon. While 
median wage and salary income for nonwhite individuals relative to white males did · 
increase significantly during this time period, the trend began well before 1968. Also in a 
trend that started before 1968 the white female/white male ratio of wage and salary 
income fell somewhat. (Burstein 1979) Noting that both of these trends began well before 
1968, it is unlikely that they are responsible for the trend reversal that occurred at 1968. 
Rather if discrimination existed it is likely that the narrowing of the wage gap simply 
aggravated the problem. Still other authors have focused on tight labor market theories 
and theories of occupational segregation. However these theories are unlikely candidates 
for explaining such an abrupt and sustained change as the observed reversal. These points 
suggest the possibility of employment discrimination as the driving force behind the trend 
reversal which, and leads to the primary hypothesis of this research. 
B. The Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this research stems from previous work to a certain degree. One 
possible explanation for the trend reversal in unemployment burdens mentioned previously 
is that civil rights legislation may have had an unexpected and perverse effect. It is 
possible that the addition of affirmative action to the existing civil rights legislation of the 
time may have influenced the decision making of discriminating employers in that they 
now viewed protected groups as substitutes in fulfilling the "good faith effort" required by 
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affirmative action. This interpretation of the law could be used by contracting firms in an 
attempt to meet affirmative action requirements and by non-contracting firms to attempt 
to be perceived as non-discriminating firms. Indeed if employers have preferences in 
discrimination such that they prefer to hire white males (most employers were white males 
at the time) over all demographic groups and also have preferences between other 
demographic groups, it is possible that affirmative action could affect various demographic 
groups differently. 
In terms of the familiar ''Becker employer discrimination", discriminating firms 
behave as though the wage for those against whom the firm discriminates is w(l + d) 
where w is the market wage rate and dis a discrimination coefficient (Becker 1957). In 
these terms, a primary goal of anti-discrimination legislation would be to force firms to 
behave as though d;= 0 for all groups. In terms of this research, the possibility that the 
discriminating employer has a different discrimination coefficient, d; , for each group that it 
discriminates against is explored2. The following preferences are assumed to hold where 
the subscript ww = white women, nww = nonwhite women, wm = white men,and the 
subscript nwm = nonwhite men: 
1) dww < dnwm < dnwf 
2) dw,,, = 0 
This implies that discriminating employers discriminate first by race and then by gender. 
This in tum leads to a labor queue of the same order, ceteris paribus. 
In the presence of discrimination and the resulting labor queue, if a firm must meet 
"quotas" in compliance with EEOC guidelines or simply hires members of certain groups 
2 This ordering may be influenced by pressures faced by the employer due to employee discrimination. 
24 
to avoid discrimination lawsuits, employers may be willing to hire as many of the group 
with the lowest d; as possible in order to achieve their goals. However, if an employer 
could hire enough members of the group with the lowest d; to meet its needs, then it 
would have little or no incentive to hire members of other minority groups. In other 
words, it simply practices discrimination of a different sort. If there are not enough 
members of the group with the lowest d; (in this case, white women) to meet its needs, 
then a firm will hire nonwhite men, and eventually nonwhite women. However, it is 
interesting to note that during the relevant time period, white women were entering the 
labor force in large numbers. Whether this is an effect oflegislation or not is questionable, 
but it is obvious that if the hypothesis of this research is correct, the existence of a large 
pool of white women available to the labor market would have a significant negative 
impact on nonwhite individuals. 
The hypothesis of this research stems from the fact that as labor markets became 
more integrated upon the passage of civil rights legislation, more women and racial 
minorities attempted to gain employment from discriminating firms. If employers prefer to 
hire white females over other protected groups, members of other minority groups are put 
at a relative disadvantage and therefore must search for a longer period of time to find 
employment. In this case, labor market desegregation would hurt those groups who are 
the furthest down the labor queue. In addition, in the presence of this type of 
discrimination, affirmative action through specifying that a "good faith effort" must be 
made might cause discriminating firms to meet the good faith effort by simply hiring the 
members of the group that it discriminates against the least. Given the hypothesized 
employer preferences, this would cause the unemployment burden of white females to 
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improve, but it would cause the relative burden of nonwhite males and perhaps nonwhite 
females to worsen due to the increased amount of time required to successfully obtain 
employment3. 
The primary hypothesis of this research is that affirmative action altered the nature 
of discrimination ( through altering the discrimination coefficients of the relevant groups) 
rather than eliminating it. In other words, it altered the manner in which labor market 
desegregation occurred in.a way that helped some groups and harmed others, perhaps 
even reversing improvements that were made in the pre-affirmative action period. This 
change in discrimination impacted the relative unemployment burdens of protected groups 
in two ways. First of all, it gave employers an incentive to hire more white females in 
order to make a "good faith effort" (thus lowering the discrimination coefficient of white 
females) at the expense of racial minorities. Secondly, affirmative action may have altered 
the relative status of nonwhite women and nonwhite men in the labor queue. Specifically, 
by allowing nonwhite women to be counted as "double minorities" affirmative action may 
have lowered the discrimination coefficient of nonwhite women, thus improving their 
position in the queue. If this change was large enough, it may in fact have pushed 
nonwhite men further down the labor queue and therefore magnified the negative effect of 
affirmative action on nonwhite men. It is hypothesized that this in tum caused the 
unemployment burden of nonwhite men to worsen during the time period under 
consideration due to longer unemployment spells. Nonwhite women may have been 
3 It is also possible that the longer duration of nonwhite individuals was magnified by a change in the job 
queue for protected groups. For example, due to civil rights legislation protected groups may have 
perceived better probabilities associated with getting preferred jobs and therefore spent more time 
searching for such jobs. However, in the face of discrimination, the higher probability of employment in 
one of the more preferredjobs may only have been realized by those groups with the lowest d;. 
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helped if the offsetting effect of being counted twice for the purpose of affirmative action 
is enough to lower their discrimination coefficient and bump them up in the labor queue. 
In addition, if employment discrimination is present, the narrowing of the wage gap could 
potentially magnify all of these results. 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
The basic method employed in the analysis of the relationship between 
discrimination, legislation, and the shift in the relative unemployment burdens of women 
and nonwhite individuals will be composed of two parts. The first portion of the analysis 
will be purely econometric in nature utilizing vector autoregression. The second method 
employed will consist of an analysis of unemployment duration and incidence by 
demographic group during the post-1968 period. 
A. Econometric Analysis 
The complexity of labor market dynamics in the macro sense enhances the 
attractiveness and worth of non-theoretical methods of analysis. One such widely 
accepted method is the use of vector autoregression (VAR). VAR is simply an 
econometric method that treats each variable in the model as endogenous. Each variable 
of the model is assumed to be a function of lagged values of itself as well as lagged values 
of all other variables in the model. In turn, vector autoregression does not require a 
theoretical specification of the model. 
A representative work of the application of a VAR that closely mirrors the analysis 
undertaken in the following chapters is presented by John Abell in his 1991 article entitled 
'Tiistributional Effects of Monetary and Fiscal Policy". In this article Abell attempts to 
investigate the possibility that monetary and fiscal policy have differing effects for 
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individual demographic groups. He notes that while most authors focus upon the effects 
of such policy on aggregate measures such as unemployment, few actually look at the 
distributional effects of such policy across race and gender groups. Abell presents a 
macro-oriented method designed to test for this possibility. The author follows the 
method of Sims (1980) in terms of the VAR techniques employed. According to Abell 
this method is ''well suited to the task of identifying the temporal response of an economic 
variable, such as an unemployment rate, to an unanticipated shock, or innovation, to a 
policy variable" (Abell 1991, 274). The author estimates separate VAR models for each 
demographic group in which lagged values of the policy variable (the money supply 
measured by M2 and changes in cyclically adjusted government budget deficit) are 
regressed on each group's unemployment rate in order to determine the responsiveness of 
that group's unemployment rate to a shock in the policy variable. In addition, in order to 
account for changes brought about by the Reagan administration, Abell divides his data 
into two periods, 1974-1980 and 1981-1987. The results of the author's Chow test 
indicate that the two time periods do indeed require separation. Through the use of 
impulse response functions Abells shows that the unemployment rates of different 
demographic do indeed respond differently to changes in macroeconomic policy over time. 
Abell' s research implies that the effect of a policy shock on a given group's 
unemployment rate can be analyzed through the use of a VAR and that each response can 
be compared to that of other groups. In addition, the author's work demonstrates that the 
response of a group's unemployment rate to a shock in a policy variable can be analyzed 
and compared for two separate time periods as distinguished by a Chow test. 
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The intent of this work is to apply macro-oriented techniques similar to those of 
Abell in order to determine the differing impact of affirmative action on various 
demographic groups. The primary difference from Abell' s work is that all of the 
unemployment rates and macro variables will be included in the VAR in order to account 
for the complex interactions between the variables. Separate equations will be run for the 
time period before April of 1968 ( approximately the date at which affirmative action was 
implemented) and the time period from April of 1968 forward and the results compared. 
This technique should reveal the ordering of the labor queue, if it existed, in each time 
period. For example, if a labor queue existed, a positive shock in the unemployment rate 
for any group should have the largest adverse impact on the groups furthest down the 
labor queue from the group that experienced the shock as the number of most preferred 
individuals available for employment increases. Specifically, if the hypothesized ordering 
existed and a shock in the unemployment rate for white males occurred, for example, the 
largest impact should be felt by nonwhite females, the next largest by nonwhite males, and 
the smallest by white females. The effects of affirmative action should be manifested by a 
change in, or the elimination of, the ordering of the labor queue during the time period 
after its passage. 
B. Analysis of Duration and Incidence 
Changes in the unemployment rate for any given time period can be attributed to 
two basic causes. First, it is possible that the length of unemployment spells changes (a 
change in duration). Secondly, it is possible that the number of people who enter 
unemployment during a given time period may change (a change in incidence). The 
relative importance of these two causes may have significant policy implications. As noted 
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in the previous section, changes in unemployment duration and incidence provide valuable 
information. However, such an analysis has not been done in a way that will satisfy the 
needs of this work. The methodology employed here will be a combination of previous 
work, some of which is presented in this section. 
Evidence of the relative importance of unemployment duration and incidence can 
shed light on the validity of the hypothesis stated previously. If this hypothesis is true, the 
duration of unemployment for nonwhite men, .and _perhaps nonwhite women, .should be a 
significant force behind the relatively worsening position of these groups in the labor force 
after 1968. T9is .stemslr.om the_fact .that nonwhitelndiYiduals are further down the labor 
queue. Given the fact that white females were entering the labor force in large numbers 
during this t~ period, employers had an ample .supply ofindividuals to hire in .order to 
appear as though they were making a good faith effort in making more jobs available for 
protected groups. In turn, as labor markets became more integrated and nonwhite 
individuals found themselves competing with white females for jobs,. nonwhite individuals 
would have to wait (revealed by longer unemployment duration) until employers found it 
"necessary" to hire more of their respective demographic group ( this effect would be 
magnified for nonwhite males as they were ''bumped" down the labor queue). Ther.efore, 
if after 1968 changes in unemployment duration for different demographic groups had the 
hypothesized ordering, the hypothesis of this paper would find support. 
The likely role played by changes in unemployment incidence is unclear. If 
employers were to fire members of demographic groups disproportionately, this would 
simply be due to discrimination in employment termination. It is believed however that 
firms would be less likely to practice discrimination in firing due to the high risks 
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associated with it. In addition, it is likely that if a discriminating firm has found its optimal 
race/gender mix, it is likely to try preserve that mix when firing is necessary. Although 
this may or may not be the case, the importance of changes in incidence is ancillary to the 
focus of this paper but provides useful information. If it is found that an increase in 
incidence relative to duration was the primary force causing the changes in the relative 
unemployment burden of white females and nonwhite individuals, the hypothesis of this 
presented here is unlikely to be accurate. If it is found that the incidence rate became 
relatively more important after 1968, it is possible that affirmative action had a different 
perverse effect than the one hypothesized. For example, it may be the case that 
affirmative action successfully prevented discrimination in hiring, but did not prevent 
discrimination in firing. In other words, it is possible that firms hired demographic groups 
according to their representation in the entire population ( or perhaps even favored 
protected groups), but it may also be that firms discriminated by firing certain 
demographic groups at higher rates thus increasing the incidence rate of certain 
demographic ~oups. 
The duration and incidence of unemployment by demographic group has been 
examined to some extent in the literature. A representative study of the literature on the 
incidence and duration of unemployment was presented by Hal Sider in 1985. Sider' s 
work was unique at the time in that it recognized the need for a method of analysis that 
did not rely upon steady state assumptions. Sider's work is typical in that it simply 
examines duration and incidence for the entire labor force. The author uses unpublished 
data from the Current Population Survey for the years 1967-1982 in order to analyze 
trends in the relative importance of duration and incidence in the determination of the 
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unemployment rate. Sider finds that over the period the long run increase in the 
unemployment rate was nearly equally attributable to increases in duration and incidence, 
but that cyclical variations were due primarily to changes in spell duration. 
A similar study was undertaken by Michael Baker in his article entitled 
''Unemployment Duration: Compositional Effects and Cyclical Variability". Baker applies 
non-steady state techniques to data from 1980-1988 by race and gender. He finds that 
during the 1980s increased duration was the primary cause of higher unemployment rates 
for most demographic groups during recessions. The author notes that this results differs 
from the results ofmo..st studie.s using data from the 19.60s and 1970s that employed 
steady state assumptions. 
In addition to the work mentioned above, numerous studies hav~ been conducted 
that examine similar but not identical topics. For example, research such as that by 
Bowers and Harkess (1979) examines duration by age and sex, whereas Butler and 
McDonald ( 1986) examine trends in unemployment duration for the entire labor force 
from 1948-1980. However, the research mentioned above fails to examine both duration 
and incidence by race and sex for the time period under examination in this research and 
fails to consider the possible effects of civil rights legislation. 
The literature to date on unemployment duration and incidence has failed to 
provide the information needed for this current work in several ways. First of all, until the 
work of Hal Sider in 1985, much of the research in this area relied upon the use of steady 
state assumptions, implying that the flows into unemployment and out of unemployment 
are constant over time. The work of Sider demonstrated that this technique is not 
optimal. Secondly, researchers employing non-steady state techniques have not examined 
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unemployment duration and incidence by demographic group over the relevant time 
period. Therefore, in order analyze unemployment duration and incidence the research 
presented here will employ non-steady state techniques similar to those of Sider, but will 
focus on ch~ges experienced by different demographic groups as was the case with Baker 
(1992) and Bowers and Harkess (1979). 
V. DATA 
This research involves two separate types of analysis (the VAR and the analysis of 
unemployment duration and incidence) each of which requires a unique data set. 
The VAR technique requires standard aggregate economic data on unemployment 
rates, GDP, M2, and the cyclically adjusted budget deficit. Data of this type is readily 
available for the time period under consideration. The unemployment data was 
downloaded from the Bureau of Labor Statistics web site. A potential limitation of this 
data is the limited racial categories provided during the earlier portion of the time period 
under consideration. ,Specifically, there are only two racial categories provided, those 
being ''white" and "nonwhite". However, this limitation is not expected to be a major 
obstacle in testing the hypothesis stated previously. The data on M2 was downloaded 
from the FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data) database located at the web site 
maintained by the St. Louis Federal Reserve. Data for the cyclically adjusted budget 
deficit was collected form the Survey of Current Business (1986). None of the data for 
this analysis is seasonally adjusted. 
The data required for the analysis of the duration and incidence of unemployment 
spells is a bit less common. Conducting a non-steady state analysis of this sort requires 
the use of unpublished Current Population Survey data on the duration of current 
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unemployment spells by individual weeks (0-99) by race and gender. This data underlies 
the published intervals and has been collected since 1967. It is available only on 
microfiche at the Bureau of Labor Statistics in Washington DC. The data used in this 
research is an unofficial copy of the data provided on these microfiche.4 
VI. ANALYSIS 
A. Vector Autoregression 
i. Stationarity 
It is a well-documented fact that time series data need to be stationary in order for 
time series relationships to be correctly modeled (Hsiao 1981). Therefore, for the purpose 
of this research the data sample was split at the April 1968 point and the data series for the 
two time periods were tested for stationarity. Inspection of the autocorrelation functions 
indicate several of the series may not be stationary and indeed warrant further testing. 
Perhaps the m,0st common test applied to this problem is the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test is provided in the SAS/ETS software and is 
applied to the data used in this research. Each data series was tested for a unit and second 
roots as well as a twelve month seasonal unit root. The test provided in the SAS software 
provides some flexibility in the specification oftheDickey-FuUer test. Specifically, the 
TREND option allows for three different possibilities: 1) TREND=O "assumes the series 
has a zero mean" 2) TREND=l "includes an intercept term" 3) TREND=2 "specifies-an 
intercept and a linear time trend". After visual inspection of the data it was determined 
that the following routine would provide the most accurate test for stationarity. This 
routine is as follows: First each series was tested for a unit root with the TREND=2 
4 This unofficial BLS data was provided by Mike Horrigan. 
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option in order to allow for the trend that was apparent in the data. If no unit root was 
found the series was tested for a seasonal root. This testing for a seasonal root was done 
first with the TREND=O option and then with the TREND= 1 option. On the other hand, 
if a unit root was found to exist in the original test, the series was differenced and checked 
for a second root using all three TREND options. If no second root was found (no 
second roots where found to exist for any of the data series) but a unit root had been· 
found, the series was differenced and tested for a seasonal root using the TREND= I 
option. It was found that all of the unemployment series and the deficit series required 
first differencing only. The GDP and M2 variables were presented as growth rates and 
were stationary, thus requiring no differencing. 
ii. Lag Lengths 
Following Enders (1995), determining the lag lengths to use in a VAR is important 
for several reasons. First of all, given the nature of a VAR, degrees of freedom are 
quickly used up as the number of lags included is increased. Recalling that a VAR has a 
total of n2p + n parameters, where p is the number of lags used for each of n variables, the 
number of parameters that must be estimated in the system increases by a factor of n2 
when the lag length is increased by one time period. Therefore, in a system such as the 
one currently under consideration increasing the lag length by one time period increase the 
number of parameters to be estimated by a total of 49. Therefore, the researcher must be 
careful not to consume degrees of freedom unnecessarily. The importance of this is 
magnified in studies such as this one where the sample size is relatively small, recalling that 
the sample was split at the April 1968 point and that .some data series are only available 
back to July of 1959. On the other hand, if the researcher does not include enough lags in 
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the model, the model will be misspecified. In order to avoid this misspecification as well 
as avoid wasting degrees of freedom, Enders suggest several possible methods for testing 
for the appropriate lag lengths. Perhaps the most useful, and most common, tests for lag 
lengths that do not rely upon asymptotic theory are the "mutivariate generalizations" of 
the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and the Schwartz-Bayesian Criteria (SBC). Both 
of these tests were used to determine the appropriate lengths in this model, but the SBC 
was found to provide more consistent results and was therefore the primary statistical tool 
to analyze lag lengths. The SBC is presented in Enders as: 
SBC = T log JrJ + N log(T) 
where JrJ is the determinant of the variance/covariance matrix of the residuals and N is the 
total number of parameters estimated in all equations of the system and T is the number of 
usable observations. A search of 3, 6, 9, and 12 (where possible) lags was conducted for 
this model for each of the time periods. The minimum SBC was found to be at a lag 
length of three months for both time periods and therefore was chosen as the appropriate 
lag length for all variables in each time period. 
iii. Verification of the Sample Split 
The hypothesis of this research relies upon the assumption that the basic structure 
of the relationship between the unemployment rates of certain demographic groups 
changed after the introduction of affirmative action. This is an assumption that can easily 
be tested with the use of Chow tests. 
Following Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991), in order to test the hypothesis that the 
coefficients for regressions in two different time periods are identical (i.e. the sample 
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should not be split because the basic relationships are the same in each time period), the 
following F statistic should be computed: 
Fk,N+m-2k= ((ESSR - ESSUR)/k)/(ESSmJ(N + M - 2k)) 
Where k is the number of restrictions, N is the number of observations in the first time 
period and M is the number of observations in the second time period. Also, ESSR is the 
error sum of squares for the restricted model and ES SUR is the error sum of squares for the 
unrestricted model. In this case, the restricted model is the model which does not split the 
sample, thus restricting the coefficients in the two time periods to be equal. Each model 
was run with three lags on each variable as was explained in the previous section. The 
critical F values for F23,213 is approximately 1.5. The F statistics calculated for each 
equation in the VAR are as follows: GDP= 2.34, Deficit= 10.07, M2 = 1.99, White Male 
= 2.29, White Female= 3.39, Nonwhite Male= 2.87, Nonwhite Female= 4.27. In turn, 
the null hypothesis of equal coefficients in the two time periods is rejected in each case and 
the sample split is thus verified. This supplies statistical confirmation of the break in the 
data and supports the notion that the relationship between the variables changed 
significantly after the introduction of affirmative action. 
iv. The Model 
As stated previously, vector autoregression is an excellent method for analyzing 
the relationships between variables, especially over time. This research is primarily 
concerned with the relative well being of different demographic groups in terms of 
unemployment rates during two different time periods. As is often noted, the VAR itself 
does not require the use of a specific theoretical model. As stated by Enders (1995) the 
primary role of the economist is simply to choose which variables are to be included in the 
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model. However, a bit of caution is warranted in the selection of the variables to be 
included in a VAR. Due to the nature of a VAR, the number of parameters that must be 
estimated tends to be large. In fact the number of parameters estimated in a VAR with n 
variables and p lags on each variable is n2p + n. Therefore, it is important to choose 
variables in a parsimonious fashion as the addition of extra variables will consume a large 
number of degrees of freedom. The variables chosen for the model in this current work 
largely reflect those of Abell, with a few minor exceptions. Unlike the work by Abell 
mentioned previously, this current work includes unemployment rates for all groups in the 
VAR thus acknowledging the complex interrelationships involved in each series. In 
addition to the unemployment rates, the growth rate of M2 ( as a measure of monetary 
policy), the cyclically unadjusted budget deficit (as a measure of fiscal policy), and the 
growth rate of real GDP are included in the model. As pointed out by Abell (1991), both 
monetary and fiscal policy have a differing impact among demographic groups in terms of 
unemployment and therefore are appropriate variables to be included in any model which 
attempts to analyze the relationship between the unemployment rates of different 
demographic groups. GDP was also included in the model, unlike Abell, as it seemed to 
be a prime candidate for enhancing the explanatory power of the model. The equations 
applied to each time period are identical and are as follows: 
GDPt = f3o + J3 GDP,t-1GDPt-l + J3 GDP,t-2GDP t-2 + J3 GDP,t-3GDP t-3 + 
J3 DEF,t-1DEF t-1 + J3 DEF,t-2DEF t-2 + J3 DEF,t-3DEF t-3 + J3 M2,t-1M2 t-1 + 
f3M2.1-2M21.2 + f3M2.t-3M2t-3 + f3WM.t-1WM t-1 + f3WM.t-2WM1-2 + 
J3 WM,t-3 WM t-3 + J3 WF,t-1 WF t-1 + J3 WF,t-2 WF t-2 + J3 WF,t-3 WF t-3 + 
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f3 NWM,t-1NWMt.1 + f3 NWM,t-2NWM t-2 + f3 NWM,t-3NWM t-3 + 
f3 NWF,t-1 NWF t-1 + f3 NWF,t-2NWF t-2 + f3 NWF,t-3 NWF t-3 + f3 SD,t-1SD5 
DEFt = f3o + f3 GDP,t-1GDPt-l + f3 GDP,t-2GDP t-2 + f3 GDP,t-3GDP t-3 + 
f3 DEF,t-1DEF t-1 + f3 DEF,t-2DEF t-2 + f3 DEF,t-3DEF t-3 + f3 M2,t-1M2 t-1 + 
f3M2.t-2M2t.2 + f3M2.t-3M2t-3 + f3WM.t-1WM t-1 + f3WM.t-2WMt-2 + 
f3 WM,t-3 WM t-3 + f3 WF,t-1 WF t-1 + f3 WF,t-2 WF t-2 + f3 WF,t-3 WF t-3 + 
f3 NWM,t-1NWMt-1 + f3 NWM,t-2NWM t-2 + f3 NWM.t-3NWM t-3 + 
f3 NWF,t-1 NWF t-1 + f3 NWF,t-2NWF t-2 + f3 NWF,t-3 NWF t-3 + f3 SD,t-1SD 
M2t = f3o + f3 GDP,t-1GDPt-l + f3 GDP,t-2GDP t-2 + f3 GDP,t-3GDP t-3 + 
f3 DEF,t-1DEF t-1 + f3 DEF,t-2DEF t-2 + f3 DEF,t-JDEF t-3 + f3 M2,t-1M2 t-1 + 
f3 M2.t-2M2 t-2 + f3 M2.t-3M2 t-3 + f3 WM.t-1 WM t-1 + f3 WM.t-2 WM t-2 + 
f3 WM,t-3 WM t-3 + f3 WF,t-1 WF t-1 + f3 WF,t-2 WF t-2 + f3 WF,t-3 WF t-3 + 
f3 NWM.t-1NWMt-1 + f3 NWM.t-2NWM t-2 + f3 NWM.t-3NWM t-3 + 
f3 NWF,t-1 NWF t-1 + f3 NWF,t-2NWF t-2 + f3 NWF,t-3 NWF t-3 + f3 SD,t-1SD 
WMt = f3o + f3 GDP,t-1GDPt-l + f3 GDP,t-2GDP t-2 + f3 GDP,t-3GDP t-3 + 
f3 DEF,t-1DEF t-1 + f3 DEF,t-2DEF t-2 + f3 DEF,t-3DEF t-3 + f3 M2,t-1M2 t-1 + 
f3 M2,t-2M2 t-2 + f3 M2,t-3M2 t-3 + f3 WM.t-1 WM t-1 + f3 WM.t-2 WM t-2 + 
f3WM.t-3WMt-3 + f3WF,t-1WF t-1 + f3WF,t-2WF t-2 + f3WF,t-3WF t-3 + 
5 Each equation includes monthly seasonal dummy variables. 
39 
f3NWM.t-1NWMt-1 + f3NWM.t-2NWMt-2 + f3NWM.t-3NWM t-3 + 
f3 NWF,t-1 NWf t-1 + f3 NWF,t-2NWF t-2 + f3 NWF,t-3 NWf t-3 + f3 SD,t-1SD 
WFt = f3o + f3 GDP,t-1GDPt-l + f3 GDP,t-2GDP t-2 + f3 GDP,t-3GDP t-3 + 
f3 DEF,t-1DEF t-1 + f3 DEF,t-2DEF t-2 + f3 DEF,t-~EF t-3 + f3 M2,t-1M2 t-1 + 
f3M2,1-2M21.2 + f3M2,t-3M2t-3 + f3WM,t-1WM t-1 + f3WM,1-2WMt-2 + 
f3WM,t-3WMt-3 + f3WF,t-1WF t-1 + f3WF,t-2WF t-2 + f3WF,t-3WF t-3 + 
f3NWM.1-1NWMt-1 + f3NWM.1-2NWMt-2 + f3NWM.t-3NWM t-3 + 
f3 NWF,t-1 NWf t-1 + f3 NWF,t-2NWF t-2 + f3 NWF,t-3 NWf t-3 + f3 SD,t-1SD 
NWMt = f3o + f3 GDP,t-1GDPt-l + f3 GDP,t-2GDP t-2 + f3 GDP,t-3GDP t-3 + 
f3 DEF,t-1DEF t-1 + f3 DEF,t-2DEF t-2 + f3 DEF,t-3DEF t-3 + f3 M2,t-1M2 t-1 + 
f3 M2,t-2M2 1-2 + f3 M2,t-3M2 t-3 + f3 WM,t-1 WM t-1 + f3 WM,t-2 WM t-2 + 
f3 WM,t-3 WM t-3 + f3 WF,t-1 WF t-1 + f3 WF,t-2 WF t-2 + f3 WF,t-3 WF t-3 + 
f3NWM.t-1NWMt-1 + f3NWM.t-2NWMt-2 + f3NWM.t-3NWM t-3 + 
f3 NWF,t-1 NWf t-1 + f3 NWF,t-2NWF t-2 + f3 NWF,t-3 NWf t-3 + f3 SD,t-1 SD 
NWFt = f3o + f3 GDP,t-1GDPt-l + f3 GDP,t-2GDP t-2 + f3 GDP,t-3GDP t-3 + 
f3 DEF,t-1DEF t-1 + f3 DEF,t-2DEF t-2 + f3 DEF,t-3DEF t-3 + f3 M2,t-1M2 t-1 + 
f3 M2,t-2M2 1-2 + f3 M2,t-3M2 t-3 + f3 WM,t-1 WM t-1 + f3 WM,t-2 WM 1-2 + 
f3 WM,t-3 WM t-3 + f3 WF,t-1 WF t-1 + f3 WF,t-2 WF t-2 + f3 WF,t-3 WF t-3 + 
f3 NWM.t-1NWMt-1 + f3 NWM.t-2NWM t-2 + f3 NWM.t-3NWM t-3 + 
40 
13 NWF,t-1 NWF t-1 + 13 NWF,1-2NWF t-2 + 13 NWF,t-3 NWF t-3 + 13 SD,1-1SD. 
As can be seen, the variables on the right hand side of each equation are identical. 
Therefore there is no advantage to using seemingly unrelated regressions techniques as it 
would involve no efficiency gains over ordinary least squares estimation. 
v. Impulse Response Functions 
Due to the complexity of a vector autoregressive system and the associated 
difficulties in the interpretation of the parameter estimates, certain methods have been 
developed to provide a more informative representation of the relationships between the 
variables in a VAR. One of the most common methods, and the one that is employed 
here, is the impulse response function. In the most basic sense, following Enders, the 
impulse response function traces out over time the effects of a shock in one variable on the 
level of the other variables contained within the system. For instance, a one standard 
deviation shock in a variable may have a contemporaneous effect on the level of some 
other variable in the system. However, over time, the overall impact of the shock in this 
variable will be greater than just this initial shock. In other words this shock may have 
secondary effects that are felt throughout the system both contemporaneously and in 
future periods. Given the fact that in a VAR each variable is assumed to be a function of 
its own lagged values and the lagged values of the other variables in the system it is 
apparent that.this contemporaneous shock will have additional effects in future time 
periods. For example, in a two variable VAR, if a variable, A, experiences a one standard 
deviation shock in time period one, that shock may have a contemporaneous impact on a 
variable, B. In the two variable example the impact of this shock will be felt in time period 
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two because the magnitude of A in time period two is a function of the levels of A & B in 
time period one. Similarly, if the VAR contains at least two lags, in time period three the 
size of the shock to variables A & B will be determined by the size of the impact of the 
initial shock in time periods one and two. If the system is stable, the impact of this shock 
should approach zero as the number of time periods increases. It is this basic ''tracing 
out" procedure that leads to the impulse response function. 
To derive an impulse response function one must first estimate the values of the 
parameters of the system, for it is the value of these parameters that will determine how a 
shock in one variable is distributed throughout the system over time. Once the parameters 
have been estimated one can introduce a shock in one variable at time period one and see 
how it "changes" the levels of the other variables over time. The magnitude of these 
changes are determined by the estimated parameters. It is assumed that this shock occurs 
only at time period one and returns to zero in time period two. 
There are two basic problems that must be resolved before impulse response 
functions can be derived. First, if one is to introduce a one standard deviation shock to a 
system, one must first be able to measure the size of the shock. Secondly, given the 
nature of a VAR, it is necessary to identify the contemporaneous nature of the shocks in 
the variables within the model. The answers to these questions are closely related. The 
first of these questions is straight forward. Given that fact that the value of a variable is 
assumed to be explained by past values of that variable and past values of the other 
variables in the system, the observed residuals from the equation represent shocks that 
have occurred to that variable in the current time period. Therefore the shock introduced 
to the system is simply a one standard deviation shock in the residuals for a given 
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equation. The answer to the second problem, following Enders, is a bit more complex 
noting that it is necessary to determine the contemporaneous nature of the shocks in the 
variables of the model in order to trace out the effects of a shock throughout the entire 
system. The most common way to approach this problem is to impose a structure on the 
relationship between the shocks. Perhaps the most common of these "decompositions" is 
the Cholesky decomposition. Such a decomposition is relatively easy to implement, but 
clearly arbitrary. A Cholesky decomposition was imposed on the system at hand, but it 
was found that when the ordering was reversed, the resulting impulse response functions 
were altered substantially. As is warned by Enders, this result indicates that the researcher 
should look for another decomposition, as the decomposition preferably should not dictate 
the outcome of the research. Keeping with the spirit of a VAR, the decomposition chosen 
was simply the one revealed by the data. In other words, the significance of the 
contemporaneous correlations between the observed shocks were tested, and those which 
were found to be significant were included as a component of the observed shock. The 
decomposition that was found to be appropriate for the relevant equations is as follows. 
Time Period one, July 1959 - March 1968: 
emnt = &mnt + Pgdpt,mnt&gdpt + Pwtt,mnt&wft + Pnmnt,mnt&nmnt + Pnwft,mnt&nm 
ewft = &wft + Pmnt,wft&mnt + Pnmnt,wft&nmnt + P nwft,wft &nwft 
enmnt = &nmnt + Pmnt,nmnt&mnt + P wft,nmnt &wft + P nwft,nmnt &nwft 
Time Period two, April 1968 - December 1980: 
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e\\'lllt = Ewmt + Pgdpt,\\'llltEgdpt + P deft,wmt Edef+ P m2t,wmt Em2 + P wft,\\'lllt Ew1t + P nwmt,wmt Enwmt 
,ewft = Ew1t + Pgdpt,wf\Egdpt + P m2t,wft Em2t + P wmt,wft ~ + P nwmt,wft En\\'lllt + P nwft,wft Enwf 
enwmt = Enwmt + Pgc1pt,nwmt8gdpt + P m2t,nwmt Em2 + P wmt,nwmt E\\'lllt + P nwmt,nwmt 8wft 
enwft = Enwft + Pwmt,nw1tE\\'lllt + p wft,nwft Ew1t 
Where e is the observed residual for the given variable in time period t, E is the 
"structural" shock in the variable in time t, and p is the contemporaneous correlation 
coefficient between the two observed shocks. 
From this point, deriving the impulse response function for a shock in a variable is 
a straightforward process. First a shock is introduced equal in size to one standard 
deviation of the observed residual for the variable. The contemporaneous portion of this 
shock is distributed through the system is fashion consistent with the decomposition listed 
above. The effects of this shock in subsequent periods are then traced out over time in a 
manner consistent with the estimated parameters of the VAR. 
vi. VAR Results 
As stated previously, a VAR is designed to reveal the relationship between certain 
variables. In this case, the primary tool used to do this is the impulse response function. 
If the hypothesis that civil rights legislation altered the relationship between the 
unemployment rates of certain demographic groups is true, this change should be apparent 
in the impulse response function associated with the two time periods. For example, when 
a positive shock occurs in a given unemployment rate, the unemployment rate for those 
individuals further down the labor queue should experience an increase in their 
unemployment rates. In fact, if labor queues arranged by race and gender do indeed exist, 
then the group furthest down the labor queue should experience the largest impact on its 
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unemployment rate, followed next in magnitude by the group second to last in the labor 
queue, and so on. In fact, all of the necessary information regarding labor queues will be 
presented in the unemployment rate impulse response functions and therefore these 
functions will be the focus of this research. If the hypothesis of this research is correct, it 
is first of essential that the impulse response function reveal a definite ordering of the labor 
queue. Secondly, the impulse response functions for the two time periods should differ in 
a way that is consistent with a worsening of the position of nonwhite males in the labor 
queue, an improvement for white females, while the effect on nonwhite females will 
depend upon the magnitude of the effect of that group being a "double minority". The 
results of the VAR analysis regarding unemployment rates are provided in the following 
paragraphs, whereas cumulative impulse response functions for all variables are presented 
in the appendixes B and C. 
1. cumulative impulse response functions prior to affirmative action 
As can be seen in Figure 2, a shock in the unemployment rate of white males 
provides a fairly clear picture of the structure of the labor queue. First of all, a one 
standard deviation shock in the unemployment rate of white males causes all of the other 
unemployment rates to increase and remain at a level that is higher than they were before 
the shock. The cumulative effects of this shock are such that nonwhite females experience 
the largest increase in unemployment rates, followed by nonwhite males and then nonwhite 
females. The first evidence of labor queues thus suggests an ordering in the time period 
prior to affirmative action along the lines of white female, nonwhite male, nonwhite 
female. However, shocks in all unemployment rates must be considered before definite 
conclusions are reached. 
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Figure 2 
Shock in White Male Unemplyment Rate, 
1959-1967. 
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Figure 3 
Shock in White Female Unemployment Rate, 
1959-1967. 
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The cumulative impulse response functions for a one standard deviation shock in 
the first time period to the unemployment rate of white females is presented in Figure 3. 
The effects of this shock are a bit less clear than the effect for a shock to the 
unemployment rate of white males, but a reasonably clear picture can still be drawn. First 
of all, the responses of the relevant unemployment rates to this shock are a bit more 
volatile. The effects of the shock tend to be the largest for white males, however, in this 
first time period the unemployment rate for white males actually falls slightly as the 
unemployment rate of white females increases. Here it is necessary to note that the impact 
of such a shock on those groups ahead in the labor.queue of the group that experiences 
the shock is uncertain. The overall effects of this shock on the unemployment rates of 
nonwhite individuals are relatively small, as well as volatile in the early time periods. Over 
time, however, the unemployment situation of nonwhite males improves by a very small 
amount and the unemployment rate for nonwhite males worsens slightly. The relevant 
point for the research at hand is that regardless of the sign of the overall impact of this 
shock, the ordering is consistent with the hypothesis of this research which also is 
supported by the evidence from a shock to the white male unemployment rate in the same 
time period. The implied ordering is: white male, nonwhite male, nonwhite female. 
Figure 4 shows the cumulative impulse response functions for a shock in the 
nonwhite male unemployment rate. These impulse response functions once again show a 
clear picture. A shock in the nonwhite male unemployment rate has the largest impact on 
nonwhite females with the unemployment rate for nonwhite females increasing by a total 
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of over 30 basis points during the 36 month period. The impact of this shock on the 
unemployment rates of white males and white females are very similar in this case. With 
the exception of the very early response to this shock, the response of white males and 
white females are nearly identical with the overall impact being a relatively small increase 
in the unemployment rate of each group. The implied ordering of the labor queue in this 
case is: white males/white females, nonwhite males. 
A shock in the unemployment rate of nonwhite females, as is presented in Figure 5, 
is once again reasonably consistent with previous results. A shock in the unemployment 
rate of nonwhite females brings about a rather large increase in the unemployment rate of 
nonwhite males. The relationship between white males and white females is different from 
the one implied in previous paragraphs. In this case, the shock in the unemployment rate 
of nonwhite females hurts white males more than it hurts white females. The ordering 
implied here is: white females, white males, nonwhite females. 
The previous paragraphs have led to the conclusion that prior to the 
implementation of affirmative action, there was a labor queue in which race and gender 
were a factor. Specifically, white individuals were at relative advantage with white 
females probably being a bit better off than white males. Nonwhite individuals were at a 
relative disadvantage with nonwhite males being better off than nonwhite females. The 
ordering thus implied in this time period is: white females, white males, nonwhite males, 
nonwhite females. 
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Figure 5 
Shock in Nonwhite female Unemployment Rate, 
1959-1967. 
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2. cumulative impulse response functions after affirmative action 
A few notes are necessary before analysis of the second period impulse response 
functions can begin, as the structure of the impulse response functions isn't nearly as clear 
as it was for the first period. First of all, the ordering is not as clear, which in itself 
suggests that affirmative action did have some effect. Secondly, unlike the first time 
period the effects of the given shocks tend to be large in the early time periods but 
gradually dissipate over time, possibly due to differing levels of policy activity. These 
facts however do not greatly reduce of the.significance of the conclusions drawn. Because 
the shape of these impulse response functions differs from that of the first time period the 
interpretation requires a little more effort. Specifically if the differing responses of certain 
demographic groups is due to the labor queue ordering, the logical response would be for 
unemployment rates to increase in the short run in a manner consistent with the labor 
queue ordering. During subsequent periods, the cumulative effect will settle to a level 
determined by the forces within the system, such as economic policy. Thus given a 
structure such as this it is believed that the most valuable information regarding labor 
queues should be found in months immediately following the shock. Any subsequent 
changes, and thus ultimate relative positions, could be determined by a number of things, 
including economic policy. The results of this analysis are however the same regardless of 
the reasons for the shape of the curves. In other words, while the structure of the impulse 
response functions in this time period may cause the picture to be slightly less clear, closer 
examination reveals a consistent interpretation. 
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Figure 6 
Shock in White Male Unemployment Rate, 
1968-1980. 
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The first group of impulse response functions under examination for the second 
time period is for the response to a shock in the unemployment rate of white males. As 
can be seen in the Figure 6, a shock in the unemployment rate of white males causes the 
unemployment rates for white females, nonwhite males and nonwhite females to increase 
immediately, and then to decrease at varying rates. Perhaps the most noticeable attribute 
of this graph is the reaction of the unemployment rate of nonwhite males to this shock. 
Nonwhite males are hurt the worst by far in the early stages, suggesting that they are the 
furthest down the labor queue. Nonwhite females are hurt only during the initial time 
period but immediately experience an improvement in their unemployment situation. 
White females experience a small increase in their unemployment rate in the early periods 
following the shock but gradually end up in a position where their unemployment rate is 
lower than it was before the shock. Although the ordering is not as clear as was the case 
in the first time period, it is obvious that nonwhite males are relative worse off than either 
nonwhite females or white females. There is no clear ordering regarding the 
unemployment rates of nonwhite females and white females, in fact they appear to follow 
a similar pattern. The ordering therefore appears to be white females/nonwhite females, 
nonwhite males. 
The responses to a one standard deviation shockin the unemployment rate of 
white females are presented in Figure 7. These impulse response functions tell a story that 
is similar to the one that has been seen throughout this analysis. First of all, nonwhite 
males are hurt substantially by the shock in the unemployment rate of white females. Both 
54 
Figure 7 
Shock in White Female Unemployment Rate, 
1968-1980. 
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white males and nonwhite females are hurt as well, but to a lesser degree. It is unclear 
whether white males or nonwhite females are hurt more initially, but it is apparent that the 
negative effects are felt for a shorter period of time for white males and eventually white 
males are helped the most. However, once again the one thing that is clear is that 
nonwhite males seem to be hurt the most. The ordering implied by Figure 7 is as follows: 
white males/nonwhite females, nonwhite males. 
A shock to the unemployment rate of nonwhite males produces results consistent 
with other shocks during this time period. From Figure 8 it is clear that nonwhite females 
experience the largest adverse effects due to this shock. The relationship between the 
effects of this shock on the unemployment rates of white males and white females suggests 
a slight advantage to white females, although the response of the two variables is very 
close throughout much of the 36 month response period. The ordering implied by these 
functions is: white female/white male, nonwhite female. 
In the time period after the implementation of affirmative action, a shock in the 
unemployment rate of nonwhite females reveals a relationship that is reasonable consistent 
with those presented in previous paragraphs. As can be seen in Figure 9, a shock in the 
unemployment rate of nonwhite females leads to a relatively large worsening of the 
position of nonwhite men in terms of unemployment rates. The implied ordering in terms 
of white males and white females is once again less clear. It appears as though there is 
little difference in the reaction of the unemployment rates of the two groups in the early 
time periods. This would imply little difference in terms of the labor queue. The ordering 
implied here is therefore: white females/white males, nonwhite males. 
56 
Figure 8 
Shock in Nonwhite Male Unemployment Rate, 
1968-1980. 
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The time period following affirmative action has a much less clear ordering than 
the time period preceding affirmative action. The one consistent result throughout all of 
the shocks is that nonwhite males were harmed the most by each shock. The rest of the 
ordering of the labor queue is less clear. The reason for this could be that the labor queue 
between those groups largely disappeared, however, looking at the graphs as a whole 
rather than examining each one separately could reveal some conclusions. While in some 
cases the relationship between the unemployment rates of certain groups is unclear, in 
other cases there are pronounced differences. In fact, if the impulse response functions 
presented heretofore are viewed as a whole and one examines how "on average" each 
group is affected, these impulse response functions imply that the ordering of the labor 
queue during the time period from March of 1968 through December of 1980 was as 
follows: white females, white males, nonwhite females, nonwhite males. 1 This suggests 
that a primary change in the labor queue after the implementation of affirmative action was 
the worsening position of nonwhite males. It is also interesting to note that the gains 
made by nonwhite females white females appear to be at the expense of nonwhite males, 
rather than white males. 
1 This conclusion assumes that if two groups have a nearly equal response to a shock in the unemployment 
rate of another, the relative ordering of these two groups can be determined by an unequal response to a 
shock in another unemployment rate. 
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Figure 9 
Shock in Nonwhite Female Unemployment Rate, 
1968-1980. 
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3. conclusion of VAR analysis 
It is clear from the previous paragraphs that the responses of the unemployment 
rates of demographic groups to shocks in the unemployment rate of other groups changed 
after the implementation of affirmative action. It is hypothesized that this is the case 
because affirmative action would encourage firms to hire groups that it discriminated 
against the least (white females) first, and eventually other groups. It was also suspected 
that nonwhite females would experience an improvement in their relative status due to that 
group being classified as a double minority. This hypothesis finds some support in the 
VAR analysis. According to this analysis the labor queue ordering changed from: 
I) white female 2) white male 3) nonwhite male 4) nonwhite female, to an ordering of: 
I) white female 2) white male 3) nonwhite female 4) nonwhite male. This implies that 
the major impact of affirmative action, in terms of unemployment rates was to bump 
nonwhite males further down the labor queue, while helping nonwhite females. Little 
evidence is found for the relative improvement of white females, although given the fact 
that white females are at the top of the labor queue for time both periods this effect would 
be diffi~ult to measure unless their advance was due to a worsening position of white 
males, but this trade-off was not hypothesized, nor found. 
\ 
Although fiscal policy and monetary policy are not major topics of this research, 
the differing impulse response functions across time periods and demographic groups may 
be related to such policy and are therefore items for further research. 
B. Analysis of Unemployment Duration and Incidence 
As mentioned previously, while changes in unemployment are caused by changes 
in unemployment duration and incidence, unemployment duration and incidence need not 
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both change or even move in the same direction. Given this fact, the analysis of the 
relative importance of unemployment duration and incidence for each demographic group 
should shed more light on the driving forces behind the trend reversal involving the 
relative unemployment burdens of these groups. If the hypothesized relationship between 
labor queues, discrimination, and affirmative action was the driving force behind this trend 
reversal, it is likely that changes in the relative importance of unemployment duration for 
the relevant groups will have an ordering that is similar to the one found in the previous 
section. Although incidence may have increased if termination discrimination became 
relatively more important over the time, in terms of the primary hypothesis of this 
research, the more important point is that duration should have increased significantly for 
those groups furthest down the labor queue. Specifically, nonwhite males should have 
experienced the biggest increase in duration, followed by nonwhite females, white males 
and finally white females. While it would be interesting to compare the duration and 
incidence of unemployment for the relevant groups both before and after the 
implementation of affirmative action, the data necessary for the analysis of unemployment 
duration and incidence is only available during the post 1967 period and therefore does 
not allow such a comparison. 
i. Technique for Estimating Unemployment Duration 
While many techniques have been developed to measure unemployment duration 
and incidence, most have relied upon steady-state assumptions which can cause serious 
bias in these calculations. (Sider 1985) A technique which does not rely upon these 
restrictive assumptions was developed by Sider in his 1985 article entitled ''Unemployment 
Duration and Incidence: 1968-82". This technique is a non-steady-state synthetic cohort 
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approach and is the primary tool used in this portion of the current analysis. Sider' s 
technique is outlined in the following par.a.graphs. 
The lack of a an accurate, published, measure of unemployment duration and 
incidence has Jedie.searchers to deriv.e such a measure from the available data. While the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics provides data on the length of current in progress 
unemployment spells, the numbers themselves provide little useful information regarding 
the actual· length of completed spells. The method used here is one that relies upon the 
data which underlie the intervals of current spell length that are provided by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. Following Sider, if a cohort entering unemployment can be traced over 
time, the average duration for that cohort can be determined. The basic reasoning behind 
this is that in each time period the number of people from the cohort that remain 
unemployed can be compared to the number of people from that cohort who were 
unemployed during the previous time period. The difference between these two numbers 
provides a measure of the number of people whose unemployment spell ended during the 
time period between the two surveys. If this cohort is followed until none of the group 
remains unemployed, a simple average of their completed unemployment spell can be 
calculated. More formally, and once again following Sider, allow /(0) to be the size of an 
cohort entering unemployment where the vector f(x), 0 < x < n, is the number of members 
of the cohort who remain unemployed after each time period. Here there are a total of x 
time periods, with a maximum ofn periods possible. Sider's equation (I) provides a 
calculation of the average duration (S) of this cohort using the notation provided. This 
equation is: 
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n 
S=I [x(f(x-1)-f(x))lf(o)J 
X=l 
For the purpose of applying Sider' s method, it is helpful to note that this is equivalent to 
stating that : 
S = (l-p1) + 2 P1(l-pJ) + 3 P1 p2(J-p3) + ... , 
= 1 _+ P1 + P1P2 + p1p2[)3 + ... , 
where Px = f(x)lf(x-1). From this point Sider generalizes to (equation 3) the following 
measure of unemployment duration: 
n x-1 
S = L g(x) [ IT P 1]U-Px) 
x=l J=O 
Here ''po is the probability of being in the initial cohort, (and equals unity). The product of 
the p/s and (1-px) is the share of the original cohort that exists in unemployment after x 
periods. The function g(x) weights exiting individuals by their completed spell" (Sider, 
1985, 462). 
This method therefore requires the specification of both Px and g(x). The 
specification of g(x) simply signifies when during a given time period the average 
unemployment spell ends. Here it is assumed that g(x) = . 5 which implies that spells end 
in the middle of the time period. As is noted by Sider, this introduces a slight bias that will 
be addressed during the estimation process. The specification of Px relies upon a 
technique which is often referred to as the "synthetic cohort approach". This approach 
relies upon the reasoning presented earlier regarding tracing a cohort over time and 
comparing the number in adjacent time periods to determine the probability of an 
individual continuing on in unemployment into the next time period. Here Px = f(x)lf(x-1) 
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and will be referred to as the continuation probability. The synthetic portion of this 
method arises from the fact that researches do not have the luxury of having access to data 
which traces out the experience of an actual cohort over time. Rather, the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics conducts monthly random surveys and publishes monthly estimates for the 
length of current unemployment spells arranged in the following intervals: < 5 weeks, 5-10 
weeks, 11-14 weeks, 15~26 weeks, 27 + weeks. Intervals such as these can be used to 
trace a synthetic cohort over time if they are specified properly. Unfortunately, rather than 
the published intervals, the synthetic cohort approach requires intervals that roughly 
correspond to the BLS' monthly sampling window. Therefore, once again following 
Sider, the CPS data which underlies the published BLS statistics were used to reconstruct 
these intervals which more closely correspond to the sampling window. Specifically, the 
following intervals were constructed for the length of current unemployment spells: < 5 
weeks, 5-8 weeks, 9-12 weeks, 13-26 weeks, 27-39 weeks, 40-52 weeks, 53-75 weeks, 
76-99 weeks. The synthetic cohort approach can then be used to see what the probability 
is that a individual will continue, for instance, from the category of< 5 weeks in time 
period t to 5-8 weeks in time period t + 1, where t is measured in months. However, this 
is not a measurement of an actual group of people as no such measure exists. In other 
words, the CPS does not survey the same people every month2, thus any cohort must be 
synthetic in nature. This method can be used to calculate the continuation probability for 
each interval specified. Once the necessary continuation probabilities have been 
calculated, the average duration of unemployment of a synthetic cohort can then be 
calculated using Sider' s equation 3. 
2 Technically, the survey is a rolling sample where-the same people are surveyed for four months. Thus, 
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ii. Duration Estimates 
The first step necessary in calculating unemployment duration is the determination 
of the relevant continuation probabilities. Due to spikes in the data, Sider, recommends 
using the following intervals in calculating the continuation probabilities: 
< 5 weeks in month t-1 continuing to 5-8 weeks in month t 
5-8 weeks in month t-1 continuing to 9-12 weeks in time t 
9-12 weeks in month t-1 continuing to 13-16 weeks in time t 
13-26 weeks in month t-3 continuing to 27-39 weeks in time t 
27-39 weeks in month t-3 continuing to 40-52 weeks in time t 
40-52 weeks in month t-3 continuing to 53-65 weeks in time t 
52-75 weeks in month t-6 continuing to 76-99 weeks in time t 
76-99 weeks in month t-6 continuing to 100 + weeks in time t 
However, due to the low numbers of certain demographic groups, it was necessary to 
combine several of the intervals of longer duration. Specifically, the last 4 intervals were 
combined to: 
27-52 weeks in month t-6 continuing to 53-75 weeks in time t 
in any given month % of the group surveyed were in the previous month's sample. 
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53-99 weeks in month t-12 continuing to 100 + weeks in time t 
where the 100 + category is defined as 1h of the total for the 99 + week interval. The 
continuation probabilities for these intervals are reported in Table 1. 
Having derived these transition probabilities, the calculation of unemployment 
duration is relatively simple. The only real complication is that due to the spikes in the 
data, it was necessary to have interval lengths longer than one month. Therefore, in order 
to calculate the monthly continuation probabilities for the individual months in these 
longer intervals, it is necessary to assume that not only is the exit rate from unemployment 
constant throughout the month, but that the exit rate is constant throughout the interval. 
This is similar to assuming that economic conditions are constant throughout the interval. 
In other words, for continuation rate of p calculated for an interval of x months, the 
monthly continuation rate would simply be p11x. The formulation of the intervals in this 
manner also allows for the spikes in the data to be smoothed. The method employed by 
Sider and the one used here acknowledges that spikes in the data are likely to be due as 
much to over reporting as they are to under reporting. Therefore, the appropriate method 
is to simply distribute the total number in each transition week equally across its actual 
interval and the one adjacent to it. 
The specification of g(x) designates the average point during the month that an 
unemployment spell ends. As is noted by Sider, if the average unemployment spell ends in 
the middle of the month, in month one g(J) would equal .5, in month two g(2) would 
equal 1.5, in month 3 g(3) would equal 2.5, etc. Sider notes that the actual time of 
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Table 1 
Continuation Rates for Selected Groups 
WM·WF ~WM.NWF WM WF NWM NWF 
1968 <5 to 5-8 0.4 0.4 0.52 0.41 1969 <5 to 5-8 0.44 0.38 0.46 0.41 
5-8 to 9-12 0.5 0.5 0.56 0.51 5-8 to 9-12 0.51 0.49 0.58 0.54 
9-12 to 13-16 0.5 0.6 0.52 0.59 9-12 to 13-16 0.6 0.59 0.57 0.66 
13-26 to 27-39 0.6 0.6 0.61 0.62 13-26 to 27-39 0.63 0.59 0.57 0.6 
27-52 to 53-75 0.8 0.7 0.76 0.76 27-52 to 53-75 0.79 0.76 0.79 0.82 
53-99 to 100+ 0.9 0.9 0.87 0.85 53-99 to 100+ 0.88 0.87 0.91 0.91 
1970 <5 to 5-8 0.5 0.4 0.55 0.47 1971 <5 to 5-8 0.57 0.46 0.6 0.54 
5-8 to 9-12 0.6 0.5 0.64 0.52 5-8 to 9-12 0.58 0.56 0.61 0.55 
9-12 to 13-16 0.7 0.6 0.69 .0.62 9-12 to 13-16 0.71 0.67 0.75 0.77 
13-26 to27~39 D.7 0.6 0.67 0.66 1.3-26to 27-39 0.69 0.69 . 0.72 0.69 
27-52 to .53-75 o_8 o_a 0.88 0.79 27-52 to 53-75 0_82 0.82 0.81 0.83 
53-99 to 100+ 0.9 .0.9 0..91 .0.88 53-99 to 100+ 0.92 0.9 0.93 0.95 
1972 <5 to 5-8 0.5 0.4 0.63 0.53 1973 <5 to 5-8 0.51 -0.43 0.57 0.49 
5-8 to 9-12 0.6 0.5 0.65 0.51 5-8 to9-12 0.53 0.48 0.57 0.57 
9-12 to 13-1-6 0.7 0.6 0.54 0.75 9-12to 13-1-6 -0.65 0.59 0.78 0.64 
13-26 to 27-39 0.7 0.7 0.7 0:63 13-26 to 27-39 0.62 01>4 0.67 0.61 
27-52 to.-53-75 0.8 0.8 0:-82 0.79 27-52 to 53-75 0.7-6 0.75 ·0.75 0;83 
53-99 to 100+ 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.-89 53-99 to 100+ 0;86 0;81 0.86 0.87 
1974 <5 to 5-8 0.5 0.4 0.59 0.54 1975 <5to 5-8 0.62 0.51 0.68 0.56 
5-8 to 9-12 0.6 0.5 0.65 0.57 5-8 to 9-'12 0:66 0.62 0.69 0.55 
9-12 tot3-16 0.7 0.7 0.72 0.65 9-12 to 13-16 0.76 0.69 0;8 0.84 
13-26to27-39 0.1 -o.6 0.66 0.67 13-26 to 27 -39 0;74 0.74 0.77 0.7 
27-52 to 53-75 a.a- o.8 0.77 0.75 27-52 to 53~75 0.9 0.87 . 0.84 0.84 
53-99 to 1 oo+ 0.9 0.8 0.94 0.88 53-99 to 100+ 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.93 
1976 <5 to 5-8 0.6 0.5 0.66 0.55 1977 <5 to 5-8 0.54 0.48 0.72 0.59 
5-8 to 9-12 0.6 0.6 0.69 0.61 5-8 to 9-12 0.56 0.58 0.62 0.64 
9-12 to 13-16 0.7 0.7 0.72 0.66 9-12 to 13-16 0.71 0.64 0.66 0.59 
13-26 to 27-39 0.7 0.7 0.72 0.71 13-26 to 27-39 0.69 0.68 0.71 0.69 
27-52 to 53-75 0.8 0.8 0.83 0.85 27-52 to 53-75 0.8 0.8 0.83 0.84 
53-99 to 100+ 0.9 0.9 .0.91 0.89 53-99 to 100+ 0.86 0.84 0.8.8. 0.88 
1978 <5 to 5-8 0.5 0.5 0.67 0.53 1979 <5 to 5-8 0.52 0.45 0.66 0..56 
5-8 to ~M2 . o_6 0_5 0.62 0.58 5-8 to 9-12 0.55 0.55 0 . .59 0.54 
9-12 to 13-16 0.6 0.6 0.74 .0.6 . 9-12 to 13-16 0.68 0.6 0.67 .0.6 
13-26 t() 27-39 0.7 0.6 0.65 0.65 13-26 to 27-39 0.64 0.62 0.66 0.64 
27-52 to53-75 0.8 0.8 0.83 0.8 27-52 to 53-75 0.8 0.8 0.85 0.84 
53-99 to 100+ 0.9 0.8 0.87 0.89 . 53-99 to 100+ 0.89 0.-87 0.87 0.88 
1980 <5 to 5-8 0.6 0.5 0.65 0.58 
5-8 to 9-12 0.6 0.5 0.67 0.56 
9-12 to 13-16 0.7 0.6 0.71 0.64 
13-26 to 27-39 0.7 0.7 0.72 0.69 
27-52 to 53-75 0.8 0.8 0.86 0.84 
53-99 to 100+ 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.87 
67 
departure from unemployment is actually slightly before the middle of the month because 
"as the month progresses, fewer members of the original group remain and the absolute 
size of the outflow declines". However, it is suspected that this bias slight and it is 
assumed that the average spell simply ends in the middle of the month. To verify this, 
slight variations of g(x) were used and the results are presented along with the other 
duration estimates in appendix D. Upon specifyingpx and g(x), the values are plugged 
into Sider's equation 3, and the calculation of the average duration of completed 
unemployment spells is straightforward. These estimates are presented in the following 
table and accompanying chart. 
Table2 
Estimated Unemployment Duration (weeks). 
WM WF NWIVI NWF 
1968 6.58 5.82 7.57 6.48 
1969 6.88 6.00 7.06 6.75 
1970 8.65 6.84 9.96 7.39 
1971 9.58 7.93 10.68 8.87 
1972 8.86 7.39 10.17 8.38 
1973 7.85 6.53 9.77 7.94 
1974 8.72 7.14 10.06 8.68 
1975 11.95 9.42 13.24 9.95 
1976 11.24 9.04 12.39 9.76 
1977 9.31 8.25 12.14 10.04 
1978 8.50 7.28 11.40 8.45 
1979 8.29 7.17 10.75 8.59 
1980 10.67 8.11 12.15 9.51 
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iii. Interpretation of Duration Results 
The importance of the increase of the duration of unemployment in the relative 
worsening of demographic groups is apparent in Table 2 and Figure 10. If the hypothesis 
of this research is correct, groups furthest down the labor queue should have experienced 
the largest increases in the duration of unemployment during this time period. 
Specifically, upon the passage of civil rights legislation as labor markets become less 
segregated and more individuals attempt to gain employment from discriminating firms, 
those individuals furthest down the labor queue will have to wait longer for employment 
as firms choose to first hire those individuals that they discriminate against the least. In 
addition, affirmative action may have altered the labor queue by allowing nonwhite 
females to count as "double minorities". If discrimination of the hypothesized type was 
the driving force behind the relative worsening of the position of certain groups, then 
increases in the duration of unemployment should have been the driving force behind this 
worsemng. 
From the chart above it is apparent that the ordering of the labor queue is 
consistent with that found in the VAR analysis. While the duration of all groups increased 
significantly during this time period, those groups furthest down the queue had the largest 
increase in the duration of unemployment as well. Specifically, from 1969-1979 (business 
cycle peak to peak) the unemployment duration of nonwhite males increased by 52.2%, 
nonwhite females by 27.3%, white males by 20.6% and white females by 19.6%. These 
results are consistent with the results of the VAR analysis in that they imply an ordering in 
,/ 
the labor queue of: 1) white females 2) white males 3) nonwhite females 4) nonwhite 
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males. While the actual ordering of the absolute duration of unemployment contradicts 
this slightly, implying an ordering of 1) white females 2) nonwhite females 3) white males 
4) nonwhite males, it is necessary to note that this measure of duration does not consider 
the reason for leaving unemployment (it could be that individuals simply leave the labor 
force), which could reflect differing labor force ties among groups. If differing labor force 
ties do not provide a sufficient explanation for these differences this would be the first 
evidence provided by this analysis to suggest that white males may have been hurt by civil 
rights legislation, as their average duration was longer than both white females and 
nonwhite females during the time period following the implementation of affirmative 
action. However, given the arguments presented in this research, the absolute levels of 
unemployment duration are not an accurate measure of the impact of affirmative action. 
Rather, it is most important that changes in unemployment duration were the primary 
cause of the worsening relative position of the relevant groups. Nevertheless, these results 
indicate that an increase in duration was an important factor in the increases in 
unemployment experienced during this time period. 
iv. Technique for Estimating Unemployment Incidence 
The estimation of unemployment incidence, following Sider, is a straightforward 
process. If it is assumed that the continuation rate for unemployment is constant over the 
course of a month, then an estimation of the weekly incidence can be derived from the 
number of individuals stating that their current unemployment spell is less that five weeks 
at time period t. Using Sider's notation, h(O ,t) "can be considered the result of a renewal 
process that reflects a weekly continuation rate p 1 • . . . . . . and the number of individuals, N, 
that entered unemployment each week over the course of the month" (Sider 1985, 466). 
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In other words, if there are four weeks in a month, h(O,t) = N(l + p1 * +( p1 */ +( p1 "/), 
where each p * is derived from the monthly continuation rate. In tum solving for N yields 
an estimate of weekly incidence. More precisely, given that there are on average 
approximately 4.33 weeks in a month, this formula generalizes to h(O,t) = N(J/3 + ( p 1 ) 113 
+ ( p 1 ) 413 + ( p 1) 713 + ( p 1 ) 1013). It is also necessary to account for rounding in this 
calculation. Specifically, the group reporting unemployment duration of0-5 weeks more 
closely represents those with an unemployment duration of0-4.5 weeks. The necessary 
number for calculating unemployment incidence during the course of a month is 0-4.3 
weeks which calls for an adjustment of the "4 weeks" category of -20% of the reported 
value. 
~ Incidence Results 
The results of the incidence analysis require a bit more interpretation than their 
duration counterparts. Due to the fact that the size of the demographic groups under 
consideration vary greatly in size, a direct comparison of unemployment incidence is less 
valuable, especially as the relative size of the given labor forces change over time. 
However, the incidence rate, defined as the estimated weekly incidence divided by the 
group's labor force can yield valuable insights in to the causes of the changes in 
unemployment. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3. 
These numbers reveal a pattern that is strikingly different from those found in the 
analysis of unemployment duration. Primarily it is apparent that unemployment incidence, 
while increasing for all groups under consideration, was nearly equally important for all 
groups in determining changes in the level of unemployment. While the incidence rate for 
nonwhite females is consistently the highest, nonwhite males and white females have 
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nearly the same incidence rate and white males have the lowest. The incidence rate seems 
to have less cyclical variability than duration and the relative position of the relevant 
demographic groups change little. Following Sider, it may be useful to examine the 
Table 3 
Incident Rates for Selected Groups (%) 
Nonwhite Nonwhite White White 
Females Males Females Males 
1968 1.29 0.72 0.74 0.38 
1969 1.16 0.77 0.73 0.37 
1970 1.32 0.84 0.84 0.51 
1971 1.24 0.84 0.82 0.48 
1972 1.31 0.77 0.81 0.47 
1973 1.34 0.75 0.81 0.44 
1974 1.24 0.87 0.92 0.52 
1975 1.31 0.89 0.89 0.56 
1976 1.31 0.85 0.84 0.51 
1977 1.33 0.82 0.85 0.52 
1978 1.37 0.81 0.81 0.50 
1979 1.29 0.84 0.81 0.50 
1980 1.29 1.01 0.79 0.56 
79/69 1.10 1.10 1.12 1.35 
changes in incidence from the one business cycle peak to another. This entails an analysis 
of the period 1969-1979. In this case, white females, nonwhite females and nonwhite 
males all experience about 10% growth in incidence, while white males experience a 3 5% 
increase. This leads to the conclusion that changes in incidence were not the driving force 
behind the changes of the relative status of demographic groups, although the consistently 
differing incidence rates for demographic groups is interesting. 
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Selected Incident Rates, 
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vi. Summary and Conclusions of Duration and Incidence Analysis 
From the preceding paragraphs it is apparent that while changes in unemployment 
incidence were felt nearly equally across all demographic groups from the period 1968-
1980. As can be seen in table 4, the driving force behind the diverging unemployment 
rates of these demographic groups was unemployment duration. 
While white males experienced adverse conditions regarding unemployment . 
incidence, the other groups under examination did not. With regards to unemployment 
duration however, nonwhite males experienced the worst changes by far, followed by 
nonwhite females, white males, and white females. These facts suggest two essential 
things. First, that the ordering of the job queue implied by the percentage increase in 
duration is l)white females 2) white males 3) nonwhite females 4) nonwhite males. 
Second, that the worsening position of nonwhite males relative to other groups was due 
an increase in unemployment duration over this time period. 
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Table4 
Duration and Incidence Summary, 1968-1980. 
Average 
unemployment unemployment Civilian Spell Vlleekly Incidence 
Rate Level Labor Force Duration Incidence Rate(%) 
NONVVMITE FEMALES 
1968 8.3 313 3780 6.48 48.66 1.29 
1969 7.8 304 3918 6.75 45.62 1.16 
1970 9.3 374 4024 7.39 53.17 1.32 
1971 10.9 450 4142 8.87 51.25 1.24 
1972 11.4 491 4323 8.38 56.44 1.31 
1973 10.6 484 4576 7.94 61.19 1.34 
1974 10.8 1514 4772 8.68 58.96 1.24 
1975 13.9 692 4967 9.95 65.07 1.31 
1976 13.6 713 5249 9.76 68.56 1.31 
1977 13.9 766 5505 10.04. 73.05 1.33 
1978 13 774 5951 8.45 81.38 1.37 
1979 12.3 759 6168 8.59 79.35 1.29 
1980 13.1 830 6359 9.51 81.83 1.29 
NONWHITE MALES 
1968 5.6 277 .4979 7.57 35.63 0.72 
1969 5.3 267 5037 7.06 38.70 0.77 
1970 7.3 380 5193 9.96 43.88 0.84 
1971 9.1 481 5277 10.68 44.33 0.84 
1972 8.9 486 5438 10.17 42.00 0.77 
1973 7.7 440 5705 9.77 42.72 0.75 
1974 9.2 544 5896 10.06 51.53 0.87 
1975 13.6 815 5976 13.24 52.91 0.89 
1976 12.7 779 6142 12.39 52.12 0.85 
1977 12.3 784 6363 12.14 52.16 0.82 
1978 11 731 6667 11.40 54.07 0.81 
1979 10.4 714 6870 10.75 57.90 0.84 
1980 13.2 922 6981 12.15 70.41 1.01 
WHITE FEMALES 
1968 4.3 1084 25423 5.82 187.49 0.74 
1969 4.2 1123 26593 6.00 192.89 0.73 
1970 5.4 1482 27521 6.84 231.24 0.84 
1971 6.3 1777 28060 7.93 230.70 0.82 
1972 5.9 1733 29159 7.39 236.11 0.81 
1973 5.3 1606 30229 6.53 244.11 0.81 
1974 6.1 1927 31438 7.14 288.62 0.92 
1975 8.6 2794 32508 9.42 289.81 0.89 
1976 7.9 2656 33734 9.04 283.29 0.84 
1977 7.3 2558 35108 8.25 298.26 0.85 
1978 6.2 2287 36679 7.28 298.83 0.81 
1979 5.9 2260 38067 7.17 309.92 0.81 
1980 6.5 2540 39127 8.11 310.54 0.79 
WHITE MALES 
1968 2.6 1142 44553 6.58 167.33 0.38 
1969 2.5 1137 45185 6.88 168.39 0.37 
1970 4 1857 46035 8.65 233.36 0.51 
1971 4.9 2309 46904 9.58 227.47 0.48 
1972 4.5 2173 48117 8.86 224.37 0.47 
1973 3.8 1836 48921 7.85 217.32 0.44 
1974 4.4 2169 49843 8.72 259.83 0.52 
1975 7.2 3627 50324 11.95 280.97 0.56 
1976 6.4 3258 51033 11.24 260.38 0.51 
1977 5.5 2883 52033 9.31 270.85 0.52 
1978 4.6 2411 52955 8.50 264.95 0.50 
1979 4.5 2405 53857 8.29 271.16 0.50 
1980 6.1 3345 54472 10.67 304.80 0.56 
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VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Prior to 1968, the status of nonwhite males in terms of unemployment burden 
relative to that white females was improving. In fact, the burden of nonwhite males was 
improving in absolute terms and the burden of white females was worsening in absolute 
terms. Then in 1968, at the time when affirmative action was first implemented, this trend 
was reversed. The status of nonwhites ( especially males) began to worsen relative to 
white women. Standard explanations of relative unemployment burdens such as human 
capital differences and wage gaps fail to explain this trend reversal. 
The purpose of this research is to examine this trend reversal more closely and 
investigate the possibility that civil rights legislation played some role in reversing the 
trend. Specifically, a theoretical explanation for labor queues related to discrimination is 
presented and then viewed within the context of affirmative action. It is hypothesized that 
given the structure of labor queues and the nature of discrimination, the introduction of 
affirmative action skewed the labor queue in a way that harmed nonwhite males and 
possibly nonwhite females and helped white females. A VAR is employed to determine 
the nature of the labor queue, if it existed, in both the time period before and the time 
period after affirmative action was implemented. If affirmative action had the intended 
effects the labor queues should have been eliminated. If affirmative action had no effect, 
or had some perverted effect, then this change should be revealed in the VAR as well. In 
addition to the VAR analysis, unemployment duration and incidence are analyzed for the 
time period under consideration in order to help explain the possible role of civil rights 
legislation. Specifically, if changes in labor queues are to explain changes in 
unemployment rate differentials, those individuals furthest down the labor queue should 
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experience the largest increases in duration of unemployment when the unemployment rate 
differential widens. In turn, it is hypothesized that if civil rights legislation distorted labor 
queues in a way that it had the effect of helping some at the expense of others, then those 
that were harmed would experience a relative worsening in their position in the labor 
queue made manifest by a longer duration of unemployment. 
The results of this research support the hypothesis in that a labor queue was found 
to exist with an ordering reasonably consistent with the one hypothesized. In addition, 
through both the VAR and duration analysis, it was found that the ordering of the labor 
queue changed in a way that harmed nonwhite males, but helped nonwhite females. 
Therefore it is likely that affirmative action, perhaps by inducing discriminating employers 
to view all protected groups as equally capable of filling "quotas", hurt the group that is 
discriminated against the most, which after 1968 was nonwhite males. The evidence 
found also implies that affirmative action helped white females at the expense of other 
groups. Given the assumed nature of discrimination, at a time when discriminating 
employers were seeking white females in order to make a good faith effort, white females 
were entering the labor force in large numbers without experiencing much difficulty in 
finding jobs. This suggests that as white females were at the top of the labor queue and 
employers were anxious to hire them, other groups would have to wait longer for firms to 
find it necessary to hire from other demographic groups. 
Although the evidence found does not correspond perfectly to the hypothesis of 
this work, it is possible to use the results from this research to tell a story that is very 
closely related to the hypothesized results. First of all, it is found that prior to 1968 a 
labor queue existed with an ordering reasonably consistent with what was expected. After 
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1968, a labor queue still existed but it had changed in a way that harmed nonwhite males 
the most. This labor queue after 1968 was supported by evidence from duration· data 
which also showed that nonwhite males were in the relatively worst position in the labor 
queue. In order to provide a consistent explanation one need merely acknowledge that in 
the face of discrimination those groups furthest down the labor queue will be hurt the 
most when labor markets are forced to become more d~segregated. Given the ordering 
prior to 1968, this implies that nonwhite females and nonwhite males would be hurt by 
labor market desegregation if discrimination was not eliminated. Secondly, if legislation 
such as affirmative action· is introduced that may manipulate the manner in which labor 
markets are desegregated in a way that does not benefit all groups equally, the structure of 
the labor queue may change and distort the manner in which desegregation of labor 
markets affects different groups. Specifically in this case, nonwhite males, who were far 
down the labor queue to begin with, were hurt more during a time oflabor market 
desegregation than would have been the case if affirmative action had not been 
implemented because affirmative action played a role in bumping them down the queue. 
The results of this research imply that affirmative action distorted the nature of 
discrimination, but did not prevent it. In fact it distorted it in a way that hurt nonwhite 
males, a group that it was intended to help. These results demonstrate the possibility of 
unintended secondary effects which may result from any legislation that fails to address all 
of the relevant information. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table 5 
VAR Parameter Estimates 
Period 1, 1959-1967 
GDP Equation 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable Estimate Error Parameter=O Prob> !Tl 
INTERCEPT 4.799687 1.03463 4.639 0.0001 
LlGDP -0.575618 0.102532 -5.614 0.0001 
L2GDP -0.192476 0.12078 -1.594 0.1157 
L3GDP 0.197568 0.092822 2.128 0.0369 
LlDEF 0.175006 0.213502 0.82 0.4153 
L2DEF -0.159026 0.270507 -0.588 0.5586 
L3DEF -0.186085 0.194888 -0.955 0.343 
LlM2 0.680646 0.356291 1.91 0.0603 
L2M2 -0.656077 0.355416 -1.846 0.0693 
L3M2 0.404783 0.339335 1.193 0.2371 
LlWM -0.467967 0.34972 -1.338 0.1853 
L2WM -0.563628 0.373258 -1.51 0.135, 
L3WM 0.572258 0.352103 1.625 0.1087 
LlWF 0.242108 0.248372 0.975 0.3331 
L2WF 0.183836 0.263326 0.698 0.4875 
L3WF -0.495592 0.232426 -2.132 0.0366 
LlNWM 0.071102 0.109534 0.649 0.5184 
L2NWM -0.055677 0.120628 -0.462 0.6459 
L3NWM 0.054769 0.111357 0.492 0.6244 
LlNWF -0.076987 0.087223 -0.883 0.3805 
L2NWF -0.030006 0.09717 -0.309 0.7584 
L3NWF -0.070917 0.089713 -0.79 0.432 
JA -2.034056 1.449404 -1.403 0.1651 
F -9.703105 1.371045 -7.077 0.0001 
AP -5.149432 1.956732 -2.632 0.0105 
M -0.871121 1.665623 -0.523 0.6027 
JN -9.107265 1.154154 -7.891 0.0001 
JL -3.29617 1.25256 -2.632 0.0105 
AU -3.385539 1.275242 -2.655 0.0099 
s -6.405545 1.077181 -5.947 0.0001 
0 -5.353323 0.977784 -5.475 0.0001 
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N -6.539261 1.446702 -4.52 0.0001 
D :-0.243344 1.068267 -0.228 0.8205 
eficit Equation 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable Estimate Error Parameter=O Prob> IT! 
INTERCEPT 0.274889 0.412855 0.666 0.5078 
LlGDP -0.035584 0.040914 -0.87 0.3875 
L2GDP -0.072498 0.048196 -1.504 0.1372 
L3GDP -0.11439 0.03704 -3.088 0.0029 
LlDEF 0.687805 0.085195 8.073 0.0001 
L2DEF 0.304319 0.107942 2.819 0.0063 
L3DEF -0.457852 0.077768 -5.887 0.0001 
L1M2 0.168599 0.142173 1.186 0.2398 
L2M2 0.10266 0.141824 0.724 0.4716 
L3M2 -0.091584 0.135407 -0.676 0.5011 
LlWM -0.181566 0.139551 -1.301 0.1976 
L2WM 0.233611 0.148944 1.568 0.1214 
L3WM -0.292088 0.140502 -2.079 0.0414 
LlWF 0.054785 0.09911 0.553 0.5822 
L2WF -0.065353 0.105077 -0.622 0.5361 
L3WF 0.175739 0.092746 1.895 0.0624 
LlNWM -0.096283 0.043708 -2.203 0.031 
L2NWM -0.040222 0.048135 -0.836 0.4063 
L3NWM 0.024008 0.044436 0.54 0.5908 
LlNWF -0.004656 0.034805 -0.134 0.894 
L2NWF 0.062618 0.038774 1.615 0.111 
L3NWF -0.009838 0.035799 -0.275 0.7843 
JA -0.04544 0.578366 -0.079 0.9376 
F 0.169955 0.547097 0.311 0.757 
AP -0.183042 0.780808 -0.234 0.8154 
M -1.076605 0.664645 -1.62 0.1099 
JN 0.472777 0.46055 1.027 0.3083 
JL -0.650686 0.499818 -1.302 0.1974 
AU -0.564016 0.508868 -1.108 0.271 
s -0.357737 0.429835 -0.832 0.4082 
0 -0.478873 0.390172 -1.227 0.223 
N -0.548993 0.577287 -0.951 0.345 
D -0.762733 0.426278 -1.789 0.078 
Equation 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
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Variable Estimate Error Parameter=O Prob> !Tl 
INTERCEPT 0.118026 0.23775 0.496 0.6212 
-Ll6DP 0.003401 0.023561 0.144 0.8857 
L2GDP -0.013861 0.027754 -0.499 0.6191 
L3GDP 0.004745 0.02133 0.222 0.8246 
LlDEF 0.064061 0.049061 1.306 0.196 
L2DEF -0. 155937 0.06216 -2.509 0.0145 
L3DEF -0.013588 0.044784 -0.303 0.7625 
L1M2 0.270646 0.081871 3.306 0.0015 
L2M2 6.064261 e.081612 e.787 0.4341 
L3M2 038265 0.077976 4.907 0.0001 
LlWM 0.082414 0.080363 1.026 0.3087 
L2WM -0.104915 0.085772 -1.223 0.2255 
L3WM 0.04693 0.080911 0.58 0.5638 
LlWF -0.045579 0.057074 -0.799 0.4273 
L2WF -0.02582 0.06051 -0.427 0.6709 
L3WF -0.062434 0.05341 -1.169 0.2465 
LlNWM 0.010999 0.02517 0.437 0.6635 
L2NWM 0.029564 0.027719 1.067 0.2899 
L3NWM -0.026834 0.025589 -1.049 0.298 
LlNWF 0.003386 0.020043 0.169 0.8663 
L2NWF -0.023464 0.022329 -1.051 0.2971 
L3NWF 0.013282 0.020615 0.644 0.5216 
JA -0.189277 0.333061 -0.568 0.5717 
F -1.142794 0.315055 -3.627 0.0005 
AP 0.412306 0.449641 0.917 0.3624 
M -0.345594 0.382747 -0.903 0.3698 
JN 0.626192 0.265215 2.361 0.0211 
JL 0.059036 0.287828 0.205 0.8381 
AU 0.112222 0.29304 0.383 0.7029 
s 0.365657 0.247528 1.477 0.1442 
0 0.143648 0.224687 0.639 0.5248 
N -0.01875 0.33244 -0.056 0.9552 
D 0.548598 0.245479 2.235 0.0287 
White Male Equation 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable Estimate Error Parameter=O Prob> !Tl 
INTERCEPT 0.240127 0.31399 0.765 0.4471 
LlGDP -0.009702 0.031117 -0.312 0.7562 
L2GDP -0.118477 0.036654 -3.232 0.0019 
L3GDP -0.099203 0.02817 -3.522 0.0008 
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LlDEF -0.03789 0.064794 -0.585 0.5606 
L2DEF 0.066048 0.082094 0.805 0.4239 
3DEF 0.011896 0.059145 0.201 0.8412 
1M2 0.093705 0.108127 0.867 0.3892 
L2M2 0.098983 0.107862 0.918 0.362 
L3M2 -0.097771 0.102982 -0.949 0.3458 
LlWM -0.176245 0.106133 -1.661 0.1014 
L2WM 0.002665 0.113277 0.024 0.9813 
3WM -0.073873 0.106857 -0.691 0.4917 
lWF -0.075208 0.075376 -0.998 0.3219 
2WF 0.051079 0.079915 0.639 0.5249 
L3WF -0.192897 0.070537 -2.735 0.008 
LlNWM 0.04201 0.033241 1.264 0.2106 
L2NWM -0.017967 0.036608 -0.491 0.6252 
L3NWM 0.009374 0.033795 0.277 0.7823 
LlNWF 0.068732 0.026471 2.597 0.0115 
L2NWF 0.058964 0.029489 2 0.0495 
L3NWF 0.101689 0.027226 3.735 0.0004 
JA 0.374708 0.439866 0.852 0.3973 
F 0.018031 0.416086 0.043 0.9656 
AP -1.422864 0.593831 -2.396 0.0193 
M -0.417826 0.505485 -0.827 0.4114 
JN 0.896021 0.350264 2.558 0.0128 
JL -0.730716 0.380128 -1.922 0.0588 
AU -1.101143 0.387012 -2.845 0.0059 
s -0.312932 0.326904 -0.957 0.3418 
0 0.001366 0.296739 0.005 0.9963 
N -0.320633 0.439046 -0.73 0.4677 
D 0.38619 0.324199 1.191 0.2377 
White Female Equation 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable Estimate Error Parameter=O Prob> JTI 
INTERCEPT -0.01807 0.40162 -0.045 0.9642 
lGDP -0.019703 0.039801 -0.495 0.6222 
2GDP -0.064842 0.046884 -1.383 0.1712 
3GDP -0.130405 0.036032 -3.619 0.0006 
lDEF -0.107983 0.082877 -1.303 0.197 
2DEF 0.120139 0.105005 1.144 0.2566 
3DEF 0.03381 0.075651 0.447 0.6564 
1M2 0.059078 0.138304 0.427 0.6706 
2M2 0.27538 0.137964 1.996 0.0499 
3M2 -0.158959 0.131722 -1.207 0.2317 
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lWM -0.015259 0.135754 -O.ll2 0.9108 
L2WM 0.325052 0.14489 2.243 0.0281 
L3WM 0.137629 0.136679. 1.007 0.3175 
lWF -0.386965 0.096413 -4.014 0.0002 
2WF 0.017719 0.102217 0.173 0.8629 
3WF -0.152678 0.090223 -1.692 0.0952 
LlNWM 0.024532 0.042519 0.577 0.5659 
L2NWM -0.029593 0.046825 -0.632 0.5295 
L3NWM -0.036253 0.043226 -0.839 0.4046 
LlNWF O.Oll834 0.033858 0.35 0.7278 
L2NWF -0.026449 0.037719 -0.701 0.4856 
L3NWF 0.00402 0.034825 O.ll5 0.9085 
JA 0.842907 0.562626 1.498 0.1387 
F -0.094203 0.532209 -0.177 0.86 
AP -0.070066 0.75956 -0.092 0.9268 
M -0.579796 0.646558 -0.897 0.373 
JN 2.687974 0.448017 6 0.0001 
JL -0.439998 0.486216 -0.905 0.3687 
AU -0.965738 0.495021 -1.951 0.0552 
s 0.043112 0.418138 0.103 0.9182 
0 0.266157 0.379554 0.701 0.4855 
N -0.49607 0.561578 -0.883 0.3802 
D -1.142457 0.414678 -2.755 0.0075 
onwhite Male Equation 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable Estimate Error Parameter=O Prob> ITI 
INTERCEPT -0.458823 1.033765 -0.444 0.6586 
LlGDP -0.064981 0.102446 -0.634 · 0.528 
L2GDP -0.233246 0.120679 -1.933 0.0574 
L3GDP -0.105007 0.092745 -1.132 0.2615 
LlDEF 0.104876 0.213324 0.492 0.6246 
L2DEF -0.170014 0.270281 -0.629 0.5314 
L3DEF 0.013267 0.194725 0.068 0.9459 
LlM2 -0.217553 0.355993 -0.6ll 0.5432 
L2M2 0.4ll336 0.355118 1.158 0.2508 
L3M2 0.212227 0.339052 0.626 0.5334 
LlWM 0.856494 0.349428 2.451 0.0168 
L2WM 0.481701 0.372946 1.292 0.2009 
L3WM 0.146902 0.351809 0.418 0.6776 
LlWF -0.160761 0.248164 -0.648 0.5193 
L2WF 0.07154 0.263106 0.272 0.7865 
L3WF -0.120733 0.232231 -0.52 0.6048 
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LlNWM -0.432025 0.109442 -3.948 0.0002 
L2NWM -0.365887 0.120527 -3.036 0.0034 
L3NWM -0.355329 0.111264 -3.194 0.0021 
LlNWF 0.240291 0.08715 2.757 0.0075 
L2NWF 0.104128 0.097089 0.2873 
L3NWF 0.176855 0:089638 1.073 0.0526 
JA 1.74637 1.448192 1.973 0.232 
F 0.985808 1.369899 1.206 0.4742 
AP -1.621434 1.955097 0.72 0.4098 
M 1.150339 1.664231 -0.829 0.4918 
JN 1.565665 1.15319 0.691 0.1791 
JL 0.05965 1.251513 1.358 0.9621 
AU -0.478856 1.274176 0.048 0.7082 
s -0.647021 1.076281 -0.376 0.5497 
0 0.174425 0.976967 -0.601 0.8588 
N -0.096097 1.445493 0.179 0.9472 
D 0.674901 1.067374 -0.066 0.5293 
0.632 
onwhite Female Equation 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable Estimate Error Parameter=O Prob> ITI 
INTERCEPT -0.215372 1.200583 -0.179 0.8582 
LlGDP 0.227472 0.118978 1.912 0.0601 
L2GDP 0.044797 0.140153 0.32 0.7502 
L3GDP 0.207002 0.107711 1.922 0.0588 
LlDEF 0.124028 0.247748 0.501 0.6183 
L2DEF -0.508602 0.313896 ~I.62 0.1098 
L3DEF 0.382978 0.226148 1.693 0.0949 
L1M2. 0.270289 0.413439 0.654 0.5155 
L2M2 -0.92804 0.412424 -2.25 0.0277 
L3M2 0.365036 0.393764 0.927 0.3572 
LlWM 0.909444 0.405815 2.241 0.0283 
L2WM 0.153005 0.433128 0.353 0.725 
L3WM 1.016362 0.40858 2.488 0.0153 
LlWF -0.189951 0.288211 -0.659 0.5121 
L2WF 0.168657 0.305564 0.552 0.5828 
L3WF -0.229352 0.269707 -0.85 0.3981 
LlNWM 0.208926 0.127103 1.644 0.1048 
L2NWM 0.018098 0.139977 0.129 0.8975 
L3NWM -0.111382 0.129219 -0.862 0.3917 
LlNWF -0.505431 0.101214 -4.994 0.0001 
L2NWF -0.324466 0.112756 -2.878 0.0053 
L3NWF 0.124844 0.104103 1.199 0.234 
88 
JA -0.826073 1.681887 -0.491 0.6249 
F 0.127649 1.590959 0.08 0.9363 
AP -4.022191 2.270591 -1.771 0.081 
M 2.272544 1.932788 1.176 0.2438 
JN 1.225008 1.33928 0.915 0.3636 
JL 1.304845 1.453469 0.898 0.3725 
AU 0.045925 1.47979 0.031 0.9753 
s -0.66812 1.24996 -0.535 0.5947 
0 0.188795 1.13462 0.166 0.8683 
N 1.136827 1.678751 0.677 0.5006 
D 1.596341 1.239616 1.288 0.2022 
Period 2, 1968-1980 
GDP Equation 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable Estimate Error Parameter=O Prob> ITI 
INTERCEPT 4.320684 0.952851 4.534 0.0001 
LlGDP -0.493397 0.092399 -5.34 0.0001 
L2GDP 0.118799 0.103528 1.148 0.2535 
L3GDP 0.153292 0.077809 1.97 0.0512 
LlDEF -0.146073 0.083797 -1.743 0.084 
L2DEF 0.128837 0.110504 1.166 0.246 
L3DEF -0.095864 0.083583 -1.147 0.2538 
L1M2 0.958901 0.22589 4.245 0.0001 
L2M2 -1.003346 0.267199 -3.755 0.0003 
L3M2 0.765897 0.234611 3.265 0.0014 
LlWM 0.254891 0.448537 0.568 0.5709 
L2WM 0.602958 0.428527 1.407 0.1621 
L3WM 0.485992 0.415664 1.169 0.2447 
LlWF -0.74464 0.300644 -2.477 0.0147 
L2WF -0.588145 0.319354 -1.842 0.0681 
L3WF -0.767299 0.298662 -2.569 0.0115 
LlNWM 0.200283 0.135486 1.478 0.142 
L2NWM -0.021165 0.149971 -0.141 0.888 
L3NWM -0.30848 0.126647 -2.436 0.0164 
LlNWF 0.120123 0.117122 1.026 0.3072 
L2NWF 0.073326 0.125267 0.585 0.5594 
L3NWF -0.218724 0.111391 -1.964 0.052 
JA -3.592198 1.182082 -3.039 0.0029 
F -12.21019 1.390703 -8.78 0.0001 
AP -3.294376 1.330829 -2.475 0.0148 
M -2.859014 1.275212 -2.242 0.0269 
89 
JN -6.945953 0.934864 -7.43 0.0001 
JL -4.869051 1.10207 -4.418 0.0001 
AU -2.626319 1.121065, -2.343 0.0208 
s -5.21477 1.020282 -5.111 0.0001 
0 -4.058878 0.80712 -5.029 0.0001 
N -5.684636 1.2457 -4.563 0.0001 
D -1.857308 1.017159 -1.826 0.0704 
Deficit Equation 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable Estimate Error Parameter=O Prob> ITI 
INTERCEPT 1.612934 0.905967 1.78 0.0776 
LlGDP 0.172988 0.087853 1.969 0.0513 
L2GDP -0.024356 0.098434 -0.247 0.805 
L3GDP -0.039334 0.07398 -0.532 0.596 
LlDEF 0.996259 0.079674 12.504 0.0001 
L2DEF -0.504799 0.105067 -4.805 0.0001 
L3DEF -0.173617 0.079471 -2.185 0.030 
L1M2 -0.113552 0.214775 -0.529 0.598 
L2M2 0.005242 0.254051 0.021 0.9836 
L3M2 -0.384292 0.223067 -1.723 0.0876 
LlWM -0.121605 0.426468 -0.285 0.776 
L2WM -0.695091 0.407442 -1.706 0.0907 
L3WM 0.100295 0.395212 0.254 0.8001 
LlWF 0.202357 0.285851 0.708 0.4804 
L2WF -0.747865 0.303641 -2.463 0.0152 
L3WF -0.559725 0.283967 -1.971 0.0511 
LlNWM -0.113204 0.12882 -0.879 0.3813 
L2NWM -0.128462 0.142592 -0.901 0.3695 
L3NWM 0.02902 0.120415 0.241 0.81 
LlNWF 0.058847 0.111359 0.528 05982 
L2NWF -0.020937 0.119104 -0.176 0.8608 
L3NWF 0.001362 0.10591 0.013 0.9898 
JA -1.329869 1.123919 -1.183 0.2391 
F -1.521275 1.322275 -1.15 0.2523 
AP -1.486746 1.265347 -1.175 0.2424 
M -2.438017 1.212467 -2.011 0.0467 
JN -1.482033 0.888865 -1.667 0.0981 
JL -2.044261 1.047844 -1.951 0.0535 
AU -0.161334 1.065904 -0.151 0.88 
s -1.22065 0.97008 -1.258 0.2108 
0 -1.750026 0.767406 -2.28 0.0244 
N -0.906582 1.184407 -0.765 0.4456 
90 
D -1.50659 0.967111 -1.558 0.122 
Equation 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable Estimate Error Parameter=O Prob> ITI 
INTERCEPT 0.247003 0.301326 0.82 0.4141 
LlGDP 0.012404 0.02922 0.425 0.672 
L2GDP 0.038243 0.032739 1.168 0.2452 
L3GDP 0.09137 0.024606 3.713 0.0003 
LlDEF -0.012583 0.0265 -0.475 0.6358 
L2DEF -0.028533 0.034945 -0.817 0.4159 
L3DEF 0.029896 0.026432 1.131 0.2604 
LlM2 0.504214 0.071435 7.058 0.0001 
L2M2 -0.075132 0.084498 -0.889 0.3758 
L3M2 0.349564 0.074192 4.712 0.0001 
LlWM 0.177457 0.141844 1.251 0.2134 
L2WM 0.318216 0.135516 2.348 0.0206 
L3WM 0.334147 0.131448 2.542 0.0123 
LlWF -0.072406 0.095075 -0.762 0.4479 
L2WF -0.184787 0.100991 -1.83 0.0699 
L3WF 0.075748 0.094448 0.802 0.4242 
LlNWM -0.00229 0.042846 -0.053 0.9575 
L2NWM 0.062462 0.047426 1.317 0.1904 
L3NWM -0.008933 0.04005 -0.223 0.8239 
LlNWF -0.032685 0.037038 -0.882 0.3794 
L2NWF 0.009944 0.039614 0.251 0.8023 
L3NWF 0.033019 0.035226 0.937 0.3505 
JA -0.733783 0.373817 -1.963 0.052 
F -1.207263 0.43979 -2.745 0.007 
AP -0.128463 0.420856 -0.305 0.7607 
M -0.486289 0.403268 -1.206 0.2303 
IN 0.337132 0.295638 1.14 0.2565 
JL 0.257061 0.348514 0.738 0.4623 
AU -0.452701 0.354521 -1.277 0.2042 
s -0.156207 0.32265 -0.484 0.629 
0 0.044704 0.25524 0.175 0.8613 
N 0.197393 0.393935 0.501 0.6173 
D 0.461607 0.321662 1.435 0.154 
"te Male Equation 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
91 
Variable Estimate Error Parameter-0 Prob> ITI 
INTERCEPT -1.030298 0.229404 -4.491 0.0001 
LlGDP -0.065605 0.022246 -2.949 0.0039 
L2GDP -0.026061 0.024925 -1.046 0.2979 
3GDP 0.03048 0.018733 1.627 0.1064 
lDEF 0.021352 0.020175 1.058 0.2921 
2DEF -0.046304 0.026604 -1.74 0.0844 
3DEF 0.024733 0.020123 1.229 0.2215 
1M2 -0.21827 0.054384 -4.013 0.0001 
2M2 0.140458 0.06433 2.183 0.031 
3M2 -0.126493 0.056484 -2.239 0.027 
lWM -0.024212 0.107988 -0.224 0.823 
2WM 0.093021 0.10317 0.902 0.3691 
3WM -0.079957 0.100073 -0.799 0.4259 
lWF 0.040928 0.072382 0.565 0.572 
-2WF 0.031083 0.076886 0.404 0.6868 
L3WF 0.075051 0.071905 1.044 0.2988 
LlNWM 0.041692 0.032619 1.278 0.2037 
L2NWM 0.036319 0.036106 1.006 0.3166 
L3NWM 0.058997 0.030491 1.935 0.0554 
LlNWF 0.002129 0.028198 0.076 0.9399 
L2NWF -0.001013 0.030159 -0.034 0.9733 
L3NWF 0.032534 0.026818 1.213 0.2275 
IA 2.468989 0.284593 8.676 0.0001 
F 1.384479 0.334819 4.135 0.0001 
AP 1.168138 0.320404 3.646 0.0004 
M 1.029222 0.307014 3.352 0.0011 
JN 1.456358 0.225074 6.471 0.0001 
JL 1.184077 0.265329 4.463 0.0001 
AU 0.613072 0.269903 2.271 0.025 
s 0.979636 0.245638 3.988 0.0001 
0 1.090684 0.194318 5.613 0.0001 
N 1.669553 0.299909 5.567 0.0001 
D 1.466519 0.244887 5.989 0.0001 
·te Female Equation 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable Estimate Error Parameter-0 Prob> ITI 
INTERCEPT -0.556792 0.311506 -1.787 0.0765 
lGDP 0.03792 0.030207 1.255 0.211 
2GDP 0.052532 0.033845 1.552 0.1234 
3GDP 0.051258 0.025437 2.015 0.0462 
92 
LlDEF 0.030882 0.027395 1.127 0.2619 
2DEF -0.057011 0.036126 -1.578 0.1173 
3DEF 0.030833 0.027325 1.128 . 0.2615 
1M2 -0.322702 0.073848 -4.37 0.0001 
2M2 0.202147 0.087353 2.314 0.0224 
3M2 -0.071446 0.076699 -0.932 0.3535 
lWM 0.34526 0.146636 2.355 0.0202 
2WM -0.034597 0.140094 -0.247 0.8054 
3WM -0.077951 0.135889 -0.574 0.5673 
lWF -0.420721 0.098287 -4.281 0.0001 
2WF 0.046684 0.104403 0.447 0.6556 
3WF 0.074781 0.097639 0.766 0.4453 
LlNWM 0.100342 0.044293 2.265 0.0253 
L2NWM 0.06202 0.049029 1.265 0.2084 
L3NWM 0.103247 0.041403 2.494 0.0141 
LlNWF 0.005899 0.038289 0.154 0.8778 
L2NWF 0.022886 0.040952 0.559 0.5774 
L3NWF -0.017493 0.036416 -0.48 0.6319 
JA 1.398852 0.386446 3.62 0.0004 
F 0.417986 0.454649 0.919 0.3598 
AP 0.610703 0.435075 1.404 0.1631 
M 0.756881 0.416893 1.816 0.072 
JN 1.453415 0.305626 4.756 0.0001 
JL 1.1119 0.360289 3.086 0.0025 
AU 0.378725 0.366499 1.033 0.3036 
s 0.668028 0.333551 2.003 0.0475 
0 0.429618 0.263864 1.628 0.1062 
N 0.499245 0.407245 1.226 0.2227 
D 0.021625 0.33253 0.065 0.9483 
onwhite Male Equation 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable Estimate Error Parameter=O Prob> !Tl 
INTERCEPT -2.505632 0.617146 -4.06 0.0001 
LlGDP -0.160279 0.059845 -2.678 0.0085 
L2GDP -0.064802 0.067054 -0.966 0.3358 
L3GDP 0.07301 0.050395 1.449 0.1501 
LlDEF -0.00492 0.054274 -0.091 0.9279 
L2DEF -0.039107 0.071572 -0.546 0.5858 
L3DEF 8.609E-05 0.054135 0.002 0.9987 
L1M2 -0.244287 0.146305 -1.67 0.0977 
L2M2 0.023702 0.17306 0.137 0.8913 
L3M2 -0.026188 0.151953 -0.172 0.8635 
93 
LlWM 0.575776 0.29051 1.982 0.0498 
L2WM 0.717118 0.27755 2.584 0.011 
L3WM 0.071591 0.269219 0.266 0.7908 
LlWF -0.407017 0.194722 -2.09 0.0388 
L2WF -0.101818 0.206841 -0.492 0.6235 
L3WF 0.169211 0.193439 0.875 0.3835 
LlNWM -0.47696 0.087752 -5.435 0.0001 
L2NWM -0.161832 0.097134 -1.666 0.098 
L3NWM 0.012369 0.082027 0.151 0.8804 
LlNWF 0.047903 0.075858 0.631 0.529 
L2NWF 0.169637 0.081134 2.091 0.0387 
L3NWF 0.047372 0.072146 0.657 0.5127 
JA 4.208325 0.765615 5.497 0.0001 
F 4.061335 0.900735 4.509 0.0001 
AP 2.591197 0.861956 3.006 0.0032 
M 2.841939 0.825934 3.441 0.0008 
JN 4.309767 0.605496 7.118 0.0001 
JL 3.925055 0.713793 5.499 0.0001 
AU 1.085696 0.726095 1.495 0.137 
s 1.935589 0.66082 2.92_9 0.0041 
0 2.313715 0.522758 4.426 0.0001 
N 3.270005 0.806819 4.053 0.0001 
D 2.907396 0.658797 4.413 0.0001 
onwhite Female Equation 
Parameter Standard T for HO: 
Variable Estimate Error Parameter-0 Prob> ITI 
INTERCEPT -0.095489 0.727979 -0.131 0.8959 
LlGDP 0.081756 0.070593 1.158 0.2492 
L2GDP 0.033105 0.079096. 0.419 0.6763 
L3GDP -0.045756 0.059446 -0.77 0.443 
LlDEF 0.067204 0.064021 1.05 0.296 
L2DEF -0.028335 0.084425 -0.336 0.7378 
L3DEF 0.039772 0.063858 0.623 0.5346 
L1M2 -0.381311 0.17258 -2.209 0.0291 
L2M2 0.378097 0.20414 1.852 0.0665 
L3M2 0.012527 0.179243 0.07 0.9444 
LlWM 0.651378 0.342683 1.901 0.0598 
L2WM -0.373886 0.327395 -1.142 0.2558 
L3WM -0.467213 0.317568 -1.471 0.1439 
LlWF 0.309566 0.229693 1.348 0.1804 
L2WF 0.645722 0.243987 2.647 0.0093 
L3WF 0.184394 0.228178 0.808 0.4207 
94 
LlNWM 0.009162 0.103512 0.089 0.9296 
L2NWM 0.189602 0.114578 1.655 0.1007 
L3NWM 0.237176 0.096758 2.451 0.0157 
LlNWF -0.661639 0.089481 -7.394 0.0001 
L2NWF -0.382808 0.095704 -4 0.0001 
L3NWF -0.221184 0.085103 -2.599 0.0106 
JA 0.763422 0.903112 0.845 0.3997 
F -0.580544 1.062499 -0.546 0.5858 
AP 0.289774 1.016755 0.285 0.7762 
M -0.030518 0.974264 -0.031 0.9751 
JN 3.130114 0.714237 4.382 0.0001 
JL 1.091734 0.841983 1.297 0.1973 
AU -1.133477 0.856495 -1.323 0.1883 
s -0.677345 0.779496 -0.869 0.3867 
0 -0.278993 0.61664 -0.452 0.6518 
N -0.461998 0.951716 -0.485 0.6283 
D -0.890844 0.777111 -1.146 0.254 
95 
APPENDIXB 
Table 6 
Cumulative 36 Month Impulse Response Functions, 
1959-1967. 
Month 
wftowm nwmtowm nwftowm wmtowf nwmtowf nwftowf 
1 -0.020182 0.131103 0.145348 -0.0234128 0.0110271 -0.00568423 
2 0.060508 0.160354 0.083266 0.0029868 0.0350414 0.030573 
3 0.032343 0.137669 0.243273 -0.057323 -0.007332 0.026489 
4 0.060011 0.152534 0.172951 -0.0207856 -0.008875 -0.0298093 
5 0.029964 0.145834 0.185489 -0.0354463 -0.011532 0.0304194 
6 0.049978 0.179198 0.190467 -0.0133126 0.0085113 -0.0406293 
7 0.037259 0.164354 0.236747 -0.0428388 -0.013113 0.0144341 
8 0.053968 0.165257 0.162199 -0.012418 0.0054528 -0.00173253 
.9 0.035068 0.156559 0.21334 -0.0369083 -0.017568 0.00179943 
10 0.052143 0.17681 0.204136 -0.0181317 0.0006743 -0.0126737 
11 0.042036 0.160386 0.202137 -0.0322234 -0.008198 0.0222601 
12 0.049665 0.168623 0.192853 -0.0195414 -5.35E-05 -0.0128432 
13 0.042119 0.163974 0.216638 -0.0303989 -0.011278 0.0108226 
14 0.05 0.170385 0.193053 -0.0200458 0.0001857 -0.00089492 
15 0.043273 0.163942 0.207913 -0.0295557 -0.009457 0.00758483 
16 0.048535 0.170499 0.202957 -0.0216322 -0.002624 -0.00290407 
17 0.044138 0.164587 0.204792 -0.027851 -0.008875 0.00950428 
18 0.047653 0.168753 0.199656 -0.0226359 -0.003763 -0.00173447 
19 0.044458 0.165852 0.208091 -0.0271745 -0.008545 0.00670294 
20 0.047403 0.168241 0.199992 -0.0229944 -0.004149 0.00150277 
21 0.044862 0.165444 0.204615 -0.0263868 -0.007911 0.00620203 
22 0.046933 0.168195 0.202904 -0.0235073 -0.004896 0.00143476 
23 0.045368 0.166064 0.20442 -0.0258624 -0.007338 0.00648351 
24 0.046737 0.167599 0.201842 -0.0237566 -0.005155 0.00249939 
25 0.045466 0.166446 0.205117 -0.0255792 -0.007232 0.00528176 
26 0.046606 0.167583 0.202543 -0.0240057 -0.005514 0.00328587 
27 0.045642 0.166452 0.20394 -0.0252981 -0.006966 . 0.00523079 
28 0.046382 0.167449 0.203211 -0.0242224 -0.005853 0.00321884 
29 0.04577 0.166658 0.203998 -0.0251139 -0.006842 0.00512601 
30 0.046301 0.167221 0.202862 -0.0243141 -0.005971 0.00371188 
31 0.045817 0.16674 0.204036 -0.0249986 -0.00676 0.00474897 
32 0.046247 0.167193 0.203188 -0.0243972 -0.006092 0.00397975 
33 0.045897 0.166759 0.203664 -0.0248804 -0.006633 0.00477094 
34 0.04618 0.167132 0.20336 -0.024472 -0.006197 0.00400788 
35 0.045948 0.166851 0.203732 -0.0248121 -0.006579 0.00469834 
36 0.046152 0.16707 0.203286 -0.0245105 -0.006247 0.00418498 
96 
wmtonwm wftonwm nwfftonwm wmtonwf wftonwf nwmtonwf 
1 -0.024822 -'0.04568 0.277289 0.0064214 -0.068172 0.226686 
2 0.019242 0.06876 0.11981 0.0629988 0.0182822 0.212702 
3 -0.015392 0.00482 0.326811 0.0525026 -0.024765 0.24302 
4 0.061328 0.062866 0.292276 0.0974446 0.0313976 0.242948 
5 0.005496 0.019151 0.295573 0.0729376 -0.001042 0.257349 
6 0.042165 0.047741 0.292334 0.110367 0.0311622 0.299639 
7 0.024884 0.024161 0.353512 0.0785662 0.0011423 0.278004 
8 0.044875 0.048776 0.257284 0.110409 0.0382416 0.279856 
9 0.023202 0.026076 0.324509 0.0852347 0.0024742 0.271232 
10 0.044654 0.048977 0.317379 0.110285 0.0313754 0.296832 
11 0.027792 0.034994 0.309087 0.0887859 0.0144425 0.276121 
12 0.041565 0.045017 0.29924 0.106949 0.0270836 0.288408 
13 0.032253 0.035884 0.331753 0.0948102 0.0149427 0.280464 
14 0.040037 0.045904 0.302306 0.104926 0.0279318 0.289242 
15 0.033064 0.037359 0.318182 0.0947428 0.0153732 0.279957 
16 0.040247 0.043253 0.31396 0.105727 0.0258223 0.290565 
17 0.033697 0.03823 0.315567 0.0960473 0.0177082 0.280055 
18 0.038303 0.042393 0.308718 0.103291 0.0236391 0.287296 
19 0.034878 0.038533 0.319137 0.098137 0.0185254 0.282837 
20 0.037854 0.042052 0.309672 0.10242 0.0234723 0.28637 
21 0.034904 0.039173 0.31449 0.0983625 0.0189331 0.281968 
22 0.037629 0.041558 0.313188 0.102382 0.0226997 0.286654 
23 0.035526 0.039833 0.314864 0.0989163 0.0197971 0.28273 
24 0.037179 0.041369 0.311626 0.101701 0.0221978 0.285544 
25 0.035876 0.0399 0.315655 0.0996152 0.0200127 0.283526 
26 0.037067 0.041202 0.312736 0.10139 0.0219733 0.285307 
27 0.035941 0.040099 0.314063 0.0997577 0.0202703 0.283455 
28 0.036912 0.040909 0.313392 0.101266 0.0216122 0.285192 
29 0.036122 0.040233 0.31427 0.100004 0.0205249 0.283735 
30 0.036715 0.040831 0.312869 0.101004 0.0214485 0.284772 
31 0.036218 0.040288 0.314263 0.100208 0.0206067 0.283945 
32 0.036678 0.040776 0.313339 0.100916 0.0213634 0.284698 
33 0.036259 0.040392 0.313807 0.100277 0.0207306 0.283955 
34 0.036622 0.040704 0.313512 0.100849 0.0212352 0.284616 
35 0.036341 0.040448 0.313944 0.100388 0.020825 0.284095 
36 0.036567 0.040675 0.31341 0.100759 0.0211781 0.284485 
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Table 7 
Cumulative 36 Month Impulse Response Functions, 
1968-1980. 
Month 
wftowm nwmtowm nwftowm wmtowf nwmtowf nwftowf 
1 0.0228155 0.0539486 0.123292 0.015394 -0.0238473 0.0909864 
2 0.0261467 0.135054 -0.00563 0.040553 0.105382 0.0802769 
3 0.0065675 0.143566 -0.06553 0.050227 0.187819 -0.047221 
4 0.0260679 0.0988014 -0.00277 0.054739 0.165601 0.039097 
5 0.0284239 0.129152 -0.01936 0.053005 0.145094 0.0700402 
6 0.0195692 0.121436 0.016207 0.040386 0.123978 0.0625004 
7 -0.006172 0.0480881 -0.04823 0.00012 0.0990693 0.011212 
8 -0.021931 0.0449785 -0.01901 -0.01238 0.0277071 0.0105944 
9 -0.02209 0.031506 -0.0053 -0.01508 0.0516178 0.0508446 
10 -0.045912 0.0092827 -0.01316 -0.0295 0.0382902 0.0348662 
12 -0.045333 -0.006799 -0.01967 -0.03671 0.0279447 0.0219993 
13 -0.040076 -0.010851 -0.0631 -0.04478 0.0157632 -0.001197 
14 -0.042987 -0.019448 -0.04972 -0.05389 -0.0072006 -0.011575 
15 -0.03925 -0.032932 -0.0281 -0.06381 -0.0170003 0.0218498 
16 -0.043875 -0.021963 -0.03045 -0.0691 -0.0296258 0.0043916 
17 -0.045034 -0.01307 -0.03496 -0.07555 -0.0142175 0.0071395 
18 -0.051111 -0.023662 -0.05158 -0.07593 -0.0299105 -0.00896 
19 -0.054677 -0.022586 -0.04905 -0.07318 -0.0248089 -0.008149 
20 -0.057484 -0.018799 -0.05101 -0.07501 -0.0166701 -4.45E-05 
21 -0.056094 -0.021782 -0.04676 -0.07526 -0.0264654 -0.010391 
22 -0.054349 -0.028917 -0.0417 -0.07611 -0.0219461 0.00454 
23 -0.05723 -0.031579 -0.04741 -0.0773 -0.0353358 -0.009257 
24 -0.056731 -0.029569 -0.05274 -0.07892 -0.0301568 -0.011466 
25 -0.056956 -0.028576 -0.05531 -0.07812 -0.028949 -0.011817 
26 -0.056111 -0.026434 -0.0499 -0.07823 -0.0299711 -0.013215 
27 -0.054315 -0.027061 -0.04649 -0.07833 -0.0274864 -0.003064 
28 -0.054223 -0.025229 -0.04544 -0.07693 -0.0288032 -0.008735 
29 -0.053644 -0.026121 -0.0457 -0.07758 -0.0256427 -0.0052 
30 -0.054385 -0.027111 -0.04864 -0.07637 -0.0300755 -0.00859 
31 -0.05349 -0.023489 -0.0478 -0.07511 -0.0256594 -0.007371 
32 -0.053489 -0.022974 -0.04959 -0.0748 -0.0249702 -0.007087 
33 -0.052908 -0.021682 -0.0481 -0.07437 -0.0251902 -0.009013 
34 -0.052079 -0.021636 -0.04606 -0.07405 -0.0226886 -0.004334 
35 -0.052821 -0.022208 -0.04604 -0.07385 -0.0246377 -0.007063 
36 -0.052872 -0.022061 -0.04547 -0.07385 -0.0224344 -0.004605 
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wmtonwm wftonwm nwftonwm wmtonwf wftonwf nwmtonw 
f 
1 0.041804 0.0649797 0.168702 0.007768 -0.0170712 0.0848877 
2 0.0613576 0.0481295 0.177527 0.05103 0.0603931 0.268616 
3 0.0719703 0.0644259 0.108068 0.070571 0.0199286 0.243875 
4 0.0896416 0.0623364 0.148856 0.079039 0.0693852 0.28589 
5 0.102355 0.0777174 0.195724 0.085172 0.0542476 0.326967 
6 0.113395 0.0733839 0.209967 0.067628 0.0776595 0.358507 
7 0.097843 0.0795858 0.154209 0.022578 0.022989 0.213493 
.8 0.092692 0.0816777 0.170221 0.006486 0.0058586 0.197193 
9 0.0870342 0.0747493 0.208905 -0.00706 -0.0124591 0.198363 
10 0.0791381 0.0788997 0.197824 -0.04088 -0.04806 0.133795 
12 0.0752425 0.0629034 0.196705 -0.05417 -0.0557046 0.136162 
13 0.0691176 0.0664798 0.171823 -0.07092 -0.0474948 0.0807504 
14 0.0652755 0.0610236 0.166096 -0.09473 -0.073474 0.0686938 
15 0.0626983 0.0556162 0.195018 -0.10499 -0.0547409 0.0425826 
16 0.0535254 0.0586362 0.178786 -0.11844 -0.0705021 0.0343127 
17 0.0478495 0.0480678 0.181441 -0.12409 -0.0699053 0.0525754 
18 0.0457719 0.0538837 0.17157 -0.12363 -0.078434 0.0252555 
19 0.0407946 0.0440091 0.156662 -0.12267 -0.0889834 0.0355253 
20 0.0392241 0.04181 0.17214 -0.12291 -0.0904733 0.0427086 
21 0.0369318 0.044954 0.166954 -0.12546 -0.0912615 0.0327794 
22 0.0343599 0.0372482 0.17185 -0.12864 -0.0898156 0.0326677 
23 0.033948 0.0411898 0.172974 -0.13188 -0.096406 0.0200377 
24 0.032879 0.0344882 0.158509 -0.13365 -0.0978734 0.0228452 
25 0.0322391 0.0357501 0.162254 -0.13293 -0.0981645 0.022323 
26 0.032414 0.0369177 0.159487 -0.13228 -0.0995195 0.0248028 
27 0.0318049 0.0358771 0.16393 -0.13271 -0.0935779 0.0249093 
28 0.0310238 0.0386995 0.166095 -0.13218 -0.0952978 0.0243398 
29 0.0311276 0.0358884 0.162182 -0.13242 -0.0931957 0.0241213 
30 0.0311976 0.0377795 0.164736 -0.13123 -0.094487 0.0203528 
31 0.0322706 0.0358249 0.161324 -0.12858 -0.0937543 0.0288846 
32 0.0329 0.0366236 0.163136 -0.12768 -0.0918103 0.0292951 
33 0.033096 0.0376785 0.162259 -0.12666 -0.0918474 0.0310566 
34 0.0334101 0.0367624 0.163442 -0.12595 -0.0889433 0.0340298 
35 0.0332014 0.0387866 0.165418 -0.12609 -0.0908584 0.0309336 
36 0.0334889 0.0369998 0.163101 -0.12566 -0.0906638 0.0341055 
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Table 8 
Estimated Unemployment Duration with Various 
Values of g(x). 
WM WF NWM NWF 
1968 g(x)=.5 6.58363 5.82292 7.56926 6.4816 
g(x)=.4 6.1504 5.38936 7.13574 6.048 
g(x)=.45 6.36702 5.60614 7.3525 6.2648 
1969 g(x)=.5 6.87949 5.99842 7.05954 6.74923 
g(x)=.4 6.44626 5.56488 6.62642 6.31654 
g(x)=.45 6.66287 5.78165 6.84298 6.53288 
1970 g(x)=.5 8.64706 6.84318 9.96278 7.39159 
g(x)=.4 8.2163 6.40991 9.53339 6.95852 
g(x)=.45 8.43168 6.62655 9.74809 7.17506 
1971 g(x)=.5 9.58094 7.93418 10.6838 8.8706 
g(x)=.4 9.15042 7.50196 10.2541 8.44218 
g(x)=.45 9.36568 7.71807 10.4689 8.65639 
1972 g(x)=.5 8.86121 7.39159 10.1676 8.37952 
g(x)=.4 8.42866 6.95856 9.73604 7.94635 
g(x)=.45 8.64494 7.17507 9.95181 8.16293 
1973 g(x)=.5 7.85064 6.5288 9.77118 7.93511 
g(x)=.4 7.41698 6.09505 9.33748 7.50198 
g(x)=.45 7.63381 6.31193 9.55433 7.71854 
1974 g(x)=.5 8.72093 7.13564 10.0583 8.68004 
g(x)=.4 8.28858 6.70201 9.62674 8.24664 
g(x)=.45 8.50475 6.91882 9.84251 8.46334 
1975 g(x)=.5 11.9509 9.42066 13.2373 9.95454 
g(x)=.4 11.5284 8.99306 12.8165 9.52538 
g(x)=.45 11.7396 9.20686 13.0269 9.73996 
1976 g(x)=.5 11.236 9.03737 12.3917 9.76196 
g(x)=.4 10.8043 8.60463 11.9626 9.33075 
g(x)=.45 11.0201 8.821 12.1771 9.54635 
1977 g(x)=.5 9.3078 8.2498 12.14 10.0442 
g(x)=.4 8.87466 7.81633 11.7084 9.61211 
g(x)=.45 9.09123 8.03307 11.9242 9.82815 
1978 g(x)=.5 8.49963 7.28222 11.4011 8.44877 
g(x)=.4 8.06611 6.8485 10.9684 8.01587 
g(x)=.45 8.28287 7.06536 11.1848 8.23232 
1979 g(x)=.5 8.29415 7.17218 10.7473 8.59452 
g(x)=.4 7.86112 6.7388 10.3151 8.16192 
g(x)=.45 8.07764 6.95549 10.5312 8.37822 
1980 g(x)=.5 10.6724 8.1143 12.1487 9.50644 
g(x)=.4 10.2422 7.6812 11.7198 9.07399 
g(x)=.45 10.4573 7.89775 11.9342 9.29021 
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